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OUTSOURCING HUMAN REPRODUCTION: EMBRYOS & SURROGACY
SERVICES IN THE CYBERPROCREATION ERA
J. BRAD REICH * & DAWN SWINK **
“Cyberprocreation”: using the Internet to create human life

Introduction

Traditionally, a child was conceived via male-female intercourse, but the Internet
provides many more possibilities. In 2011 Patrick, a single, sterile man wants a baby, but
does not want to adopt. 1 He goes online and performs a Google search for eggs 2 and
sperm 3 to discover millions of ready suppliers. 4 Patrick purchases these materials
through PayPal. 5 He wants his child as soon as possible, 6 so he has the tissues shipped to
*

B.B.A, University of Iowa, J.D. with Honors, Drake University Law School, L.L.M., University of
Missouri-Columbia School of Law, Assistant Professor of Business Law University of Puget Sound. This
article is dedicated to Pete Countryman the meanest, and maybe the best man I ever knew.

**

J.D. Drake University Law School, Associate Professor, University of St. Thomas. This article is
dedicated to my sister, Peg Grundmeier.
1

Patrick is a fictional character used for illustrative purposes.

2

A January 4, 2011, Google search using “egg donor wanted” returned 85,301 hits in .14 seconds
(examples included: www.thrdonorsource.com, www.tinytreasuresagency.com, www.eggdonation.com,
www.dreamdonation.com, and www.coriseggdonorservices.com).

3

A January 4, 2011, Google search using “sperm donor wanted” returned 127,101 hits in .18 seconds
(examples included: www.privatesperm.com, www.sperm-donors-worldwide.com, and
www.fairfaxcryobank.com, and www.Xytex.com).

4

Although Patrick is intrigued by entities offering “designer” embryos (see infra text acc. note 20) it is
unclear if there is an online “designer” bank operational at this time, although there has been at least one
available online recently. See Debra Saunders, Embryos Made to Order, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE,
Aug. 8, 2006, available at http://www.sfgate.com/cgibin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2006/08/08/EDGOBIQ0G01.DTL. It appears the founder has since closed this
“bank” due to public pressure and commentary. See, e.g., Designer Embryos?, available at
http://moraltheology.blogspot.com/2006/08/designer-embryos.html (last visited Jan. 9, 2011).
5

6

See https://www.paypal.com/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).

Patrick could have opted to store the embryos at an embryo bank using a process known as
“cryopreservation.” A January 4, 2011, Google search using “embryo bank storage” generated 343,000
hits in .28 seconds (examples included: www.sperm1.com, www.spermbankcalifornia.com, and
www.brussellsivf.be/embryo_bank). “Cryopreservation” means freezing the embryo for future use. See
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a South African fertility clinic 7 where the egg is fertilized and implanted into an Indian
surrogate, also discovered online. 8 Patrick regularly monitors ultrasound using Sight
Speed video link 9 and receives weekly email medical updates with portable document
format attachments (pdfs). 10 He connects his laptop computer to his television and
watches the birth in his living room via Skype. 11 He then retains a “guide” to accompany
the newborn to his local airport where he meets his new baby for the first time. He pays
all costs through secure websites. Patrick created human life through cyberspace. There
is nothing “traditional” about potential baby making in the Cyberprocreation era.
While this scenario may seem implausible to some, that is only because it is so
different from how many envision human procreation. Every technological aspect
identified is readily available and potential human life is truly just a few cyber links
away. That reality raises many issues begging discussion and analysis. This article
focuses on two: embryo donation and surrogacy. We contend that while the Internet
increased the availability of, and the market for, human embryos and surrogacy services
to a larger audience than ever envisioned, it also created significant and unimagined legal
concerns for embryo donors, 12 suppliers, 13 surrogates 14 and surrogate providers. 15
Parts I and II of this article provide a background on various assisted reproductive
technology (ART) procedures and perspective on current applications. We will see that a
David I. Hoffman, et al., Cryopreserved Embryos in the United States and Their Availability for Research,
79 FERTILITY & STERILITY 1063, 1066 (2003).
7

A January 4, 2011, Google search using “fertility clinic services” generated 24,000,000 hits in .22 seconds
(examples included www.fertilitycenter-uconn.org, www.americanfertility.com, and
www.midlandfertility.com).

8

A January 2, 2011, Google search using “surrogacy services” generated 429,000 hits in .26 seconds
(examples included www.surrogteparenting.com, www.fertlity-docs.com, and www.surrogacyabroad.com).

9

See http://www.sightspeed.com/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).

10

See What is a PDF File, available at http://www.kb.iu.edu/data/aftt.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).

11

See http://www.skype.com/intl/en-us/features/allfeatures/video-call/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).

12

See infra text accompanying note 21.

13

See infra text accompanying note 23.

14

See infra text accompanying note 24.

15

See infra section I. Necessary Caveat.
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combination of need, technological advancement, cost and process effectiveness, and
increasing social acceptance will fuel the future use of donor embryos and/or surrogates.
Part III discusses the Internet’s impact on ART. Without question, the Internet
increased the level of information available on virtually any subject. 16 This section
addresses three significant Cyberprocreation developments. First, the Internet likely
creates or influences the idea that people should be, or use, reproductive goods or service
providers. Second, it fosters new approaches and developments. Third, it shapes where
people pursue ART, a development known as “Reproductive Tourism.”
In Part IV we look at international, federal, state, and voluntary association regulation
of embryo and surrogacy practices. We will find that despite the significant danger posed
by defective embryos or inadequate surrogates, along with the investments some
consumers are willing to incur, 17 these areas are the “wild west” 18 and largely
unregulated.
Part V analyzes potential parental rights and responsibilities of embryo donors and
surrogates. While it will undoubtedly surprise some, it is increasingly likely that
surrogates may have parental rights and, to the surprise of the surrogate, she may have
parental responsibilities as well. Parties may try to address these issues through
surrogacy contracts, but we will see that there is no guarantee that such agreements will
be legally enforceable.
Finally, Part VI shifts the focus from parentage to product liability. We analyze
potential liability for embryo donors and suppliers under breach of warranty, strict
product liability, and negligence causes of action. We then assess potential surrogate and
surrogate provider liability under negligence and breach of contract. The article

16

See, e.g., eHow, http://www.ehow.com, (giving information on such topics as how to milk a goat, how to
pay for items online, or how to stay awake while racing in the Iditarod); see also HowStuffWorks, Inc.,
http://www.HowStuffWorks.com (providing access to bizarre facts and explanations of how things work).
17

See, e.g., Susan Donaldson James, Bringing Out Baby: Who Pays for IVF?, ABC NEWS, Apr. 8, 2008,
available at http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=4607004&page=1 (last visited Jan. 14, 2011)
(reporting that Fay Johnson paid for one IVF child by securing a second home mortgage and a second child
using the couple’s inheritance, and for two failed procedures).
18

See Debra Spar, Taming the Wild West of Assisted Reproduction, COLUMBIA SPECTATOR, Feb. 26, 2009,
available at http://www.columbiaspectator.com/2009/02/26/taming-wild-west-assisted-reproduction (last
visited Jan. 13, 2011).
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concludes with predictions and recommendations as society continues forward in the
Cyberprocreation Era.
I. A NECESSARY CAVEAT
Readers will quickly realize that much is unsettled, and certainly unknown, in the
rapidly developing world of ART. This article represents an important discussion, but
clear language and consistent use is essential to guide our collaborative journey. We,
therefore, provide certain operational definitions before we proceed further:
1. “Embryo” – the prefetal product of human conception from implantation
through the eighth week of development. 19
2. “Designer embryo” – an embryo created to attempt to include or exclude
certain resulting characteristics. 20
3. “Embryo donor” – the person(s) who causes the embryo to exist. 21
4. “Embryo donation” – providing an embryo in exchange for compensation. 22
19

This definition is appropriate for our discussion; however, the development during this time actually
encompasses multiple steps with increasing cell division. Initially the sperm fertilizes one or more eggs,
resulting in a zygote. The zygote develops in a blastocyst within a few days. The blastocyst becomes an
embryo once it has developed cells to support both the fetus and the placenta. See How Sex Works,
available at http://health.howstuffworks.com/sexual-health/sexuality/human-reproduction10.htm (last
visited Dec. 30, 2010).
20

See, e.g., Couples Offered Designer Babies (PGD Embryo Screening), available at
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2166642/posts) (last visited Dec. 26, 2011).
21

This could actually encompass a wide variety of situations: fertile couples, a couple or individual using
an egg or sperm donor, or a couple or individual using an egg and sperm donor.

22
While it may seem unusual to define a donor as a person receiving compensation, that is the appropriate
definition when discussing donation of human reproductive tissues eggs, sperm, or embryos because such
“donors” are really “sellers”. As analogies to more established tissue markets, see, e.g., The Egg Donor
Program, Becoming an Egg Donor, available at http://www.eggdonation.com/becoming-an-eggdonor/BecominganEggDonor.php) (last visited Jan. 14, 2011) (promising to reward donors with gifts and
the highest level of compensation); Sperm Donors Inc., available at
http://www.spermdonorsinc.com/Fees.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011) (identifying compensation to sperm
donors as ranging from $1,000-2,000 depending on qualifications).
Embryo donation is different from embryo adoption. See Brandon S. Mercer, Embryo Adoption: What
are the Laws, 26 J. Juv. L. 73, 73 (2006) (“[E]mbryo adoption is the ‘donation of frozen embryo(s) from
one party to a recipient who wishes to bear and raise a child.’ Embryo adoption is simply defined as the
gifting of embryos.”). See also Jaime E. Conde, Embryo Donation: The Government Adopts a Cause, 13
Wm. & Mary J. of Women & L. 273, 279-283 (2006). But see Paula J. Manning, Baby Needs a New Set of
Rules: Using Adoption Doctrine to Regulate Embryo Donation, 5 Geo. J. Gender & L. 677, 678 (2004)
(“The terms ‘embryo donation’ and ‘embryo adoption are synonymous….”). This contention is frequently
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5. “Embryo supplier” – the person or entity that provides an embryo to
prospective parent(s), but has no biological connection to the embryo. 23
6. “Surrogate” – a woman who is paid to act as a replacement for another woman
who will not, or cannot, carry a pregnancy through to term. 24
7. “Surrogate provider” – an entity providing a surrogate to prospective parent(s).
II. RE-CONCEPTUALIZING CONCEPTION
Traditionally conception occurred through intercourse between a male and
female, with the male supplying the sperm and the female providing the eggs. ART is the
umbrella term for various medical technologies creating conception through means other
than coital reproduction. There are a number of ART strategies. 25 The oldest and most
common is Artificial Insemination (AI). 26 The next most common is In Vitro
well supported by entities that merge the concepts, likely causing confusion. See, e.g.,
http://www.embryoadoptionn.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2011) (“The legal process of the transfer of the
embryos from the donor to the adopter is governed by contract law rather than adoption law. The embryos
are “owned” by the donating family and “ownership” is given to the adopting family before the embryos
are thawed and transferred into the adopting mother's womb. Adoption agencies wrap the protections of
current adoption practices around the process of embryo donation.”).
23

Common examples are fertility clinics offering embryo donation. See, e.g., Conceptual Options,
available at http://www.conceptualoptionn.com (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
24

There are two types of surrogates, “traditional” and “gestational”. In a traditional surrogacy the
surrogate’s egg(s) are fertilized by donor semen using IVF and re-implanted in the surrogate’s body. In a
traditional surrogacy the surrogate is both the biological mother (as the egg donor) and the birth mother. In
a gestational surrogacy the surrogate carries an embryo using an egg donated by a third party. Here the
surrogate is the birth mother, but not the biological mother as she is not the egg donor. The vast majority of
current surrogacy relationships, perhaps as high as ninety-five percent, are gestational. See CAROL
SANGER, DEVELOPING MARKETS IN BABY-MAKING: IN THE MATTER OF BABY M IN CONTRACT STORIES
127, n. 118 (2007). One author argues, quite convincingly, that the perception of “baby selling” has
effectively destroyed the market for traditional surrogates. See Noa Ben-Asher, The Curing Law: On the
Evolution of Baby-Making Markets, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 1885, 1918-1919 (2009).
Surrogacy may also be “commercial” or “altruistic”. A commercial surrogate is compensated, an
altruistic surrogate is not. See Amy M. Larkey, Redefining Motherhood: Determining Legal Maternity in
Gestational Surrogacy Arrangements, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 605, 608 (2003).
25

Examples of such techniques include intracytoplasmic sperm injections (ICSI) (injecting a single sperm
directing into an egg), gamete intrafallopian transfer (GIFT), zygote intrafallopian transfer (ZIFT), and
Intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI), embryo transfer, and increasingly, surrogacy. See DEBORA L.
SPAR, THE BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION
17 (2006).
26

AI is the least intrusive ART procedure. AI takes previously ejaculated sperm and implants it into a
woman’s cervix or utrauterine lining. There are several forms of insemination process such as standard
vaginal (see Justyn Lezin, (Mis)Conceptions: Unjust Limitations on Legally Unmarried Women’s Access to
Reproductive Technology and Their Use of Known Donors, 14 Hastings Women’s L.J. 185, 191 (2003))
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Fertilization (IVF). 27 The goal of such procedures is to successfully fertilize a human
egg, resulting in an embryo. That embryo may then be stored for future use or implanted
into a woman’s uterus for gestation. Gestation may involve the services of a surrogate.
There is very recent growth in ART practices using embryo donation and/or surrogates 28
and, going forward, these two trends will be increasingly prominent for, at least, four
reasons.
First there is, and will be, increasing need. This need may be rooted in biology, legal
constraints, economics, culture, or a combination of these and other factors. Biologically

and intrauterine (see KIM TOEVS & STEPHANIE BRILL, THE ESSENTIAL GUIDE TO LESBIAN CONCEPTION,
PREGNANCY AND BIRTH 304-5 (2002)). There are two forms of AI but they differ based on who is
providing the sperm. In Artificial Insemination by Husband, the husband is the donor. In Artificial
Insemination by Donor, the donor is someone other than the recipient-mother’s husband.
27

IVF (literally meaning “in glass”) requires a sperm donor and a physician’s/clinician’s assistance for
implantation. The process begins with hormonal stimulation of a woman’s ovaries to produce multiple
eggs. This woman may be the intended birth mother or she may be an egg donor who will not carry any
resulting child. The eggs are surgically removed and placed in a glass Petri dish. Sperm are then
introduced to the eggs. If successful, the sperm fertilizes the eggs and upon an eight-cell stage, the “preembryo” is transferred to a woman’s uterus by cervical catheter. See Weldon E. Havins & James J.
Dalessio, Reproductive Surrogacy at the Millennium: Proposed Model Legislation Regulating “NonTraditional” Gestational Surrogacy Contracts, 31 McGeorge L. Rev. 673, 681 (2000).
28

This rapid evolution cannot be over-stated. As recently as 2004 the President’s Council on Bioethics
concluded that there was no embryo commerce taking place in the United States. See Jeffery T. Wise,
Embryo Banking as a Novel Options for the Infertile? Law Policy, and a Proposed Model Act, 8 Hous. J.
Health L. & Pol’y 163, n. 82 (2007). Within 24 months “The World’s First Human Embryo Bank” was
available online and based in San Antonio, Texas. This “Bank” was properly known as the Abraham
Centre of Life. See Rob Stein, Texas Firm First to Offer Ready-Made Embryos, available at
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/headline/metro/4451076.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). We can
now obtain embryos from diverse entities including Conceptual Oasis (see
http://www.conceptualoptionn.com/embryo-donation last visited Jan. 11, 2011), Dream a Baby (see
http://www.dreamababy.com/embryo-donation.htm last visited Jan. 11, 2011) and Bethany Christian
Services (see http://www.bethany.org/a55798/bethanywww.nsf/0/12a23f0bc63400a085257289006eb5d6
(last visited Jan. 11, 2011).
Of course, “growth” requires context. As one article properly notes, surrogacy is one of the least used
ART procedures (see Debora Spar & Anna M. Harrington, Building a Better Baby Business, 10 MINN. J.L.
SCI. & TECH. 41, 46 2009)), but this fails to recognize the pronounced increase recently. See Ronni Berke,
Single Men Turning to Surrogates, CNN, Dec. 23, 2008, available at
www.cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/12/23/single.men.parenting/?iref=mpstoryview) (last visited Jan. 30, 2011)
(“[T]he Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, representing scores of reproductive clinics, reports
that the number of gestational surrogate births in the [United States] quadrupled between 1996 and 2006.”
Id.). We also note that there are, at least, thirty clinics in the United States offering surrogacy services with
one boasting more than 1,400 births and another with fifty surrogates available. See Egg Donor and
Surrogacy Programs, Infertility Resources for Consumers, available at
http://www.ihr.com/infertility/provider/donoregg.html (last visited Jan. 30, 2011). Additionally domestic
physicians are increasingly using foreign surrogates. See infra text accompanying notes 91-98.
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the fact is that many people have difficulty conceiving, 29 and that problem is getting
worse. 30 For some reproduction is biologically impossible, even though there are no
infertility issues. 31 While many people might need embryos or surrogacy services, the
laws of their domiciles may limit, or prohibit outright, such reproductive assistance,
forcing them to secure this aid elsewhere. 32 Need is frequently financial. Those unable
or unwilling 33 to carry an embryo to term can hire a surrogate. There are many women,
both in the United States 34 and abroad 35, who need the income surrogacy can provide. 36
29

An estimated 15% of American women and 10-15% of American men are infertile. See Spar &
Harrington, supra note 28, at 44.
30

See U.S. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, Population
Fact Sheet, available at www.cdc.gov (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (reporting that an estimated 7.3 million
American women aged 15-44 reported some impaired ability to have children in 2002, compared with 6.1
million in 1995, and 4.9 million in 1988).
31

A significant percentage of those using surrogates are gay men or couples or single, straight men. See
Berke, supra note 28 (this article discusses two agencies that have each experienced a fifty percent increase
in the number of single men using surrogacy services).
32

See infra text accompanying notes 82-84.

33

See Ruby L. Lee, New Trends in Global Outsourcing of Commercial Surrogacy: A Call for Regulation,
20 Hastings Women’s L.J. 275, 282 (2009) (discussing “…the trend of fertile, married, career women
opting out of bearing their own children in favor of convenience.”) (“An IVF consultant and endoscopist,
Dr. Sunita Tandulwadkar confirmed that an increasing interest in using surrogates has come from career
women who do not want to take a break from their careers.” Id.).

34

See Habiba Nosheen & Hilke Schellmann, The Most Wanted Surrogates in the World, GLAMOUR
MAGAZINE, Oct. 2010, available at http://www.glamour.com/magazine/2010/10/the-most-wantedsurrogates-in-the-world) (last visited Jan. 3, 2011) (discussing the trend by U.S. military wives to serve as
surrogates at least in part to supplement family income). Surrogacy contracts in the United States appear to
range between $40,000 and $100,000. See Nick Williams, India Adopts Surrogate Mother Hotspot,
VIDETTE REP., Nov. 11, 2006, available at
http://www.videtteonline.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33247:india-adoptssurrogate-mother-hotspot&catid=37:newsnationalglobal&Itemid=53, (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). While
those numbers may reflect the total contract “price”, actual compensation to the surrogate might be far less.
See Jennifer L. Watson, Growing a Baby for Sale or Merely Renting a Womb: Should Surrogate Mothers
be Compensated for their Services?, 6 Whittier J. Child & Fam. Advoc. 529, 531 (2007) (“Currently, the
typical fee for a first time surrogate mother ranges from $14,000 to $18,000, with an average of $15,000.”
Id.). See also the Open Arms Egg Donation and Surrogacy Agency, available at
http://www.openarmsconsultants.com/index.php?action=sg (last visited Jan. 11, 2011) (this service pays
surrogates a minimum fee of $18,000).
At least one court refused to enforce a surrogacy contract, in part precisely because they were concerned
about the effect of compensation. See R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 689 N.E.2d 790, 796 (Mass. 1998)
(“Eliminating any financial reward to a surrogate mother is the only way to assure that no economic
pressure will cause a woman, who may well be a member of an economically vulnerable class, to act as a
surrogate.”).
35

See Lee, supra note 33, at 278 (“The average Indian surrogate receives between $2,800 and $5,600 for
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There are many people who desperately want a child but cannot reproduce and cannot
afford to pursue IVF. Embryos and/or surrogates may provide the only options. Finally,
need may be cultural as well, particularly when infertility brings shame. 37 Although
there is no published data, anecdotally it appears that the use of surrogates has grown
exponentially over just the past few years. 38
her services. That is roughly equal to ten years salary for rural Indian women.” Id.) See also Krittivas
Mukherjee, Rent-a-Womb in India Fuels Debate, EZILON INFOBASE, Dec. 10, 2010, available at
http://www.ezilon.com/information/article_17613.shtml (last visited Jan. 5, 2011) (“[A] surrogate is paid
anything between $3,000 and $6,000, a fortune in a country with an annual per capita income of around
$500.”)
36

See, e.g., Margot Cohen, A Search for a Surrogate Leads to India, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 2009, at W8,
available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704252004574459003279407832.html?KEYWORDS=M
argot+Cohen) (last visited Oct. 10, 2010) (discussing one Indian woman’s decision to be a surrogate
because “[H]aving someone else’s child sounded like a better option than her other plan: selling a kidney.”
Id.)
While there is some information regarding surrogates and financial need, there is little publicly available
regarding embryo donors, but we gain some insight from recent human egg donation trends. Fertility clinics
report a dramatic increase in the number of egg donations and procedures performed each year. This is
particularly true during the recent economic times. Fertility clinics nationwide report a significant increase
in the number of donors coming forward. See, e.g., Stephanie Smith, Dim Economy Drives Women to
Donate Eggs for Profit, CNN NEWS, Aug. 8, 2008, available at
http://cnn.com/2008/HEALTH/08/05/selling.eggs/index.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2011) (reporting Chicago
clinics fielding 30 to 50 inquiries a day from potential donors compared to the prior year’s 10 to 30, while
the Reproductive Science Center of the Bay Area received 158 calls in July 2008, in contrast to 120 in July
2007); see Juju Chang and Kiran Khalid, Less Money Means More Egg Donors, ABC NEWS, Oct. 27,
2008, available at http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/OnCall/story?id=6119578&page=1 (last visited Jan. 17,
2011) (stating fertility experts throughout the country reported a 30% to 40% increase in applicants); see
also Judy Keen, Recession Finds Fertile Field of Egg, Sperm Donors, U.S.A. TODAY, July 7, 2009, at 1A
(reporting that Health News, an Irvine, California company that operates a national donor referral service,
had a 40% increase since February, 2008). As of 2008 more than 100,000 young women sold or donated
eggs to approximately 470 IVF clinics in the United States. See W. Kramer, et al., U.S. Oocyte Donors: A
Retrospective Study of Medical and Psychosocial Issues, OXFORD J. OF HUM. REPROD., vol 24, No. 12, at
3144, available at http://humrep.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/12/3144.full (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
37

As an example, in Japan infertility carries serious social stigma, adoption is frowned upon, and clinics
cannot provide surrogates. As a result, at least one American fertility center has been recruiting Asian
American women to serve as surrogates for Japanese clients for the past several years. See Mark Alpert,
New U.S. Export to Japan: Babies, FORTUNE, Aug. 10, 1992, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1992/08/10/76762/index.htm, (last visited Dec.
30, 2010). Japanese customers use Indian surrogates a well. See, e.g., Japanese Girl Born to Indian
Surrogate Arrives Home, CNN WORLD NEWS, Nov. 2, 2008, available at http://articles.cnn.com/2008-1102/world/india.baby_1_indian-law-japanese-girl-jaipur?_s=PM:WORLD) (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
38

See Cohen, supra note 36 (“Robert Rupak, president of PlanetHospital, a California-based medicaltourism country, says that in the first eight months of [2009] he sent 600 couples or single parents overseas
for surrogacy, nearly three times the number in 2008 and up from just 33 in 2007.”) See also Surrogate
Mothers: Outsourcing Pregnancy in India, MERINEWS, June 26, 2008, available at
http://www.merinews.com/article/surrogate-mothers-outsourcing-pregnancy-in-india/136421.shtml) (last
visited Jan. 2, 2010); Lorraine Ali, The Curious Lives of Surrogates, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 29, 2008, available

Outsourcing Reproduction:
Embryos & Surrogacy Services in the Cyberprocreation Era

9

Second, reproductive technology advances at a truly astounding rate. 39
Many ART procedures are now so common that we lose perspective of how recently they
came into existence. America celebrated the birth of its first IVF-conceived baby in
1981; 40 just twenty-five years later at least 54,656 babies were born in the United States
using IVF and IVF-related procedures. 41 We have only been able to store human eggs
since 2004. 42 In 2007, the world’s first in vitro maturation babies were born. 43 We may
have even gotten to the point where women do not need men to create babies. 44 There is
at http://www.newsweek.com/2008/03/29/the-curious-lives-of-surrogates.html) (last visited Jan. 2, 2011);
and Foreign Couples Turn to India for Surrogate Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2008, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/asia/04iht-mother.1.10690283.html (last visited Jan. 2, 2010).
39

This may be particularly true of medical technology regarding embryos. See generally Liza Mundy,
Souls on Ice: America’s Embryo Glut and the Wasted Promise of Stem Cell Research, MOTHER JONES,
July/August 2006, available at http://motherjones.com/politics/2006/07/souls-ice-americas-embryo-glutand-wasted-promise-stem-cell-research (last visited Jan. 14, 2011) (This article discusses a wide range of
recent developments, including the combination of more effective fertility drugs and laboratory procedures
producing more embryos per cycle, implantation procedures using fewer embryos, and the fact that a
woman recently gave birth using an embryo that had been frozen for 13 years. The last occurrence
underscores how unclear the future of embryo storage and usage really is, as professionals do not even
know how long frozen embryos will be “good for” going forward.) See also Conceived Together, Born 11
Years Apart: Deep-frozen Third Sister Arrives After Record Gap, available at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1341766/Conceived-born-11-years-apart-Deep-frozen-sisterarrives-record-gap.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2010).
40

Miss Elizabeth Carr was born in Norfolk, Virginia on December 28, 1981. See DEBORA L. SPAR, THE
BABY BUSINESS: HOW MONEY, SCIENCE, AND POLITICS DRIVE THE COMMERCE OF CONCEPTION 17, 28
(2006).
41

See CENTERS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
(ART) REPORT: SECTION 5 – ART TRENDS, 1996-2006 (hereinafter “2006 ART Trends”), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/section5.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
42

See Aina Hunter, Why Worry? Put Your Eggs on Ice! ABC NEWS, April 9, 2008, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Health/story?id=4591877&page=1 (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). The difficulty with
storing eggs is that eggs have high water content that tends to produce destructive ice crystals in the egg
when frozen. Id. While data is limited, one study showed that eggs survive the new storage process 85% of
the time. See also Cherie Black, Seattle Women Now Have Option to Freeze Eggs, available at
wwwseattlepi.com/printer2/index.asp?ploc=t&refer=http://www.seattlepi.com/local/350763_eggfreezing11
.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
43

In vitro maturation (“IVM”) is similar to IVF. The key difference is that, in IVF, the egg donor is placed
on hormones to stimulate their ovaries and the eggs are withdrawn when mature. In IVM no hormones are
used and the eggs are removed before maturation. See Tracy Connor, Have a Baby at New Low, Low Price,
Says Fertility Doctor Joel Batzofin, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/news/2009/04/13/2009-0413_have_a_baby_at_new_low_low_price.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
44

In 2009 British researchers announced that they had taken stem cells from an embryo and used them to
create human sperm. See Sperm from Stem Cells, CBS NEWS, July 9, 2009, available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/07/09/uttm/main5148372.shtml (last visited Jan. 9, 2011) (“Sperm

Outsourcing Reproduction:
Embryos & Surrogacy Services in the Cyberprocreation Era

10

little reason to doubt that we will regularly see regular such ART “miracles” going
forward or that the use of reproductive technology will continue to increase.
The third driving force is the cost and process effectiveness of purchasing embryos
and/or using surrogacy services relative to IVF. IVF based procedures are not single,
point-in-time activities; they are more accurately a series of steps over different periods
of time. The Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) refers to these as “cycles of
treatment” 45 or, for purposes of this article, “cycles.” The average cost for a single cycle
of IVF is $10,000-12,000, but can reach as much as $25,000 if features such as donor
gametes or intracytoplasmic sperm injection (ICSI) are added. 46 And, while the rate of
success has grown considerably, most women need more than one cycle to accomplish
pregnancy. 47 It is not uncommon for a person or couple to spend $100,000 just
attempting to conceive using traditional IVF based procedures. 48 Making IVF even more
cost prohibitive is the fact that the vast majority of states do not require insurance
companies to cover, or offer coverage for, infertility diagnosis and treatment. 49 Using

could be produced from female stem cells. That would mean women would no longer need men to create
babies.”)
45

“Because ART consists of several steps over an interval of approximately two weeks, an ART procedure
is more appropriately considered a cycle of treatment rather than a procedure at a single point in time.” See
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2006 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY SUCCESS
RATES NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS (2008) (hereinafter CDC SUCCESS RATES), at
4, available at http://www.cdc.gov/ART/ART2006/508PDF/2006ART.pdf, (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
46

See Marcia C. Inhorn & Michael Hassan Fakih, Arab Americans, African Americans, and Infertility:
Barriers to Reproduction and Medical Care, 85 Fertility & Sterility 844 (2006) (estimating the mean cost
of IVF in the United States in 2002 at $9,547). Cost varies by region and clinic. Id.

47

See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, 2005 ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY
SUCCESS RATES NATIONAL SUMMARY AND FERTILITY CLINIC REPORTS (hereinafter 2005 ART Report), 6,
available at http://www.cdc.gov/art/ART2005/508PDF/2005ART508.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2009).
Ironically success rates actually decrease with each additional cycle. Id. at 17.
48

See Spar, supra note 18, at 46. This is true even when the patient knows the probability of success is low.
See Judith F. Daar, Regulating Reproductive Technologies: Panacea or Paper Tiger?, 34 Hous. L. Rev.
609, 632 (1997). Patients are frequently willing to pay nearly $30,000 for a 10% chance of having a baby.
See Melinda B. Henne et al., The Combined Effect of Age and Basal Follicle-Stimulating Hormone on the
Cost of a Live Birth at Assisted Reproductive Technology, 89 Fertility & Sterility 104, 107 (2008).

49

See 50 State Summary of State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Therapy, Nat'l.
Conference of State Legislatures, available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/50infert.htm (last
visited Feb. 1, 2011).
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embryos and/or surrogates may decrease total costs, perhaps by 50% or more, 50 while
also increasing the likelihood of success. 51
Finally, ART use is increasingly common and possibly more socially acceptable. 52 In
1996, there were 64,681 ART cycles performed in the United States, 53 by 2008 that
number increased to 148,055 resulting in 46,326 live births (deliveries of one or more
living infants) and 61,426 infants. 54 Although ART use is still relatively rare, it has
doubled over the past decade. 55
It is also, arguably, acceptable not only to use ART to try to create life, but to attempt
to create life through designer embryos. 56 While some contend there is no need for such

50

The Abraham Center (see Stein, supra note 28) charged $2,500 per embryo and estimated total costs for
a pregnancy at $10,000. See also Wise supra notes 28, 37.
51

See http://www.embryoadoptionn.com/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2011). (“A recent study in the medical journal
Fertility and Sterility shows an average 35% pregnancy success rate using frozen embryos vs. an average
32% for fresh [IVF] cycles.”) We were unable to locate the study referenced. Further, while we cannot say
that it is a well-established medical fact, designer embryos may have higher pregnancy success rates than
non-designer embryos, particularly when the egg and sperm come from donors with an established track
record of achieved pregnancies. See Wise, supra note 28, at 21 (“[T]hey can increase the chance of a
successful pregnancy from approximately thirty percent to an impressive seventy percent.” Id.)
52

Examples of celebrities who publicly acknowledge using IVF to conceive include David and Courtney
Cox, Marcia Cross, Penn Jillette, while Angela Bassett, Robert DeNiro, Peri Gilpin, Kelsey Grammar, and
Deidre Hall used surrogates. See No Baby on Board, available at www.nobabyonboard.com/moviestv.html
(last visited Jan. 14, 2011). It may even be the case that ART discussions have become social events. See
Non-profit Organization Holds Egg Donor/Surrogacy Event in Popular Beverly Hills Nail Salon: Need an
egg donor? How about a surrogate? Know someone who does? Yes? Then this event is for you (an
invitation to a program “…designed to deliver sensitive and important information about surrogacy and egg
donation in a casual, relaxed setting, where participants enjoy complimentary manicures, pedicure, and
martinis.”) available at http://www.gaynewswire.com/nonprofit-organization-holds-egg-donorsurrogacyevent-popular-beverly-hills-nail-salon/6192 (last visited Dec. 29, 2010).
53

See supra note 41.

54

See http://www.cdc.gov/art/ (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).

55

Id.

56

We say “arguably” because there are certainly opinions to the contrary. See, e.g., Joyce E. Cutler,
Designer Baby Offer to Screen Embryos for Eye, Hair, Skin Pigmentation Dropped (discussing a California
fertility clinic’s decision to withdraw its screening plan due to “…apparent negative social impacts.”) and
Daniel Martin, Couple Pay 9,000 to Have First British Web Baby, available at
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-429393/Couple-pay-9-000-British-web-baby.html (last visited
Jan. 14, 2011) (“Stephen Green, national director of Christian Voice, said ‘The objection to the idea of
designer babies is that it divorces procreation form the act of sexual congress, and there is a real sense in
which it is playing God.’”).
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embryos 57 the reality is that there will be demand for three reasons. First, while there are
embryos in storage, 58 the vast majority is unavailable to prospective parent(s). 59 Second,
even if those embryos were readily available, there are questions about potential
viability. 60 Third, it is simply ridiculous to discount the reality that would-be parents
hope to “produce” a child with certain characteristics or abilities. 61
III. SYMBIOSIS
The embryo market is, at least domestically, a very recent development 62 and
surrogate use increased dramatically over the past few years. 63 The logical explanation
for these developments is the Internet. As recently as 1999 people advertised in

57

See, e.g., The Slope is Really Slippery, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, Mar. 24, 2007, available at
http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2007/march/24.29.html (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
58

Id. (alleging that there are some 500,000 embryos in cryopreservation in the United States).

59

See Susan Crockin, How do you “Adopt” a Frozen Egg? available at
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2005/12/04/how_do_you_adopt_a_froz
en_egg/ (last visited Jan. 14, 2011):
According to a 2003 study, approximately 88 % of those frozen embryos are still under
the active control of the patients who created them and are still trying to create a family
with them. Of the remaining embryos, only about 2 % of patients were found to actually
choose to donate their embryos to another family for procreation -- likely, at least in part,
from discomfort over donating their born child's potential genetic sibling. In my own
practice and those of many of my colleagues, almost 75 % of patients who seriously
consider donation ultimately decide not to donate to another family.
60

See Jennalee Ryan, The World’s First Embryo Bank, FREE REPUBLIC, June 25, 2006, available at
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1676440/posts (last visited Jan. 29, 2011)

61

See, e.g., Joan O’C.Hamilton, What are the Costs?, STANFORD MAGAZINE, Nov/Dec 2000, available at
http://www.stanfordalumni.org/news/magazine/2000/novdec/articles/eggdonor.html (last visited Jan. 14,
2011):
[F]uturistic scenarios of parents-in-waiting “constructing” a child already have arrived. Scouring
a website where they can select donors, hopeful couples can quickly get caught up in comparison
shopping, where physical features are the stock in trade. “Couples who would have been looking
for someone with a lovely character before [the Internet] now say, 'Well, we like No. 98, but
haven't you got someone with a bluer eye?'”

It may even be the case that prospective parents desire characteristics that may not commonly be perceived
as desirable. See Sarah-Jay Templeton, Deaf Demand Right to Designer Deaf Children, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/health/article3087367.ece (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
62

See supra note 38.

63

Id.
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newspapers for human tissue donors 64 and only 40% of the American population aged
16-years and older accessed the Internet. 65 Ten-years later, 74% did 66 and the United
States currently has more than 266,224,500 Internet users. 67 Global Internet use increased
444.8% from 2000 to 2010. 68 As of June 2010, there were approximately 1,966,514,816
Internet users worldwide. 69 In 1993 the United States ART industry was estimated at
$164 million per year. 70 By 2010, that figure grew to at least $1.7 billion. 71 Eighty
percent of adult Internet users seek health information online 72 and reproductive health
questions are one of the most common areas of interest. 73 It is no coincidence that
Internet usage and ART growth mirror each other. The fact is that the Internet allows
prospective ART buyers and sellers to find each other in ways unimaginable even a
decade ago. But the Internet is not only providing ART access it is shaping, at least,
three significant ART ideas.
First, many ART buyers and sellers find each other online, but that pre-supposes
awareness of the existence of the “other party”. While it is impossible to quantify, there is
64

That year a married couple put ads in the Harvard and Princeton newspapers seeking an egg donor who
was 5’10” or taller and who had scored over 1400 on her SATs. See Barbara Katz Rothman, The Potential
Cost of the Best Genes Money Can Buy, CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC., June 11, 1999, at A52.
65

See Internet Use (U.S.), INTELLIQUEST, May 23, 1999, available at http://www.mediaawareness.ca/english/resources/research_documents/statistics/internet/internet_use.cfm (last visited Jan. 14,
2011).

66

See Sydney Jones, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, Jan. 29, 2009, available at
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1093/generations-online) (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
67

See http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2011).

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

See Judith Gaines, A Scandal of Artificial Insemination, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 7, 1990, § 6, at 23.

71

See Spar & Harrington, supra note 28, at 47.

72

See Nathan Cortez, Patients Without Borders: The Emerging Global Market for Patients and the
Evolution of Modern Health Care, 83 Ind. L.J. 71, 85 (2008) (citing Harris Interactive, Number of
“Cyberchondriacs”- Adults Who Have Ever Gone Online for Health Information-Increases to an Estimated
136 Million Nationwide). Searching health information ranks behind only email use and consumer goods
and services searches online. Id.
73

See Wolfgang Himmel, et al., Information Needs and Visitors' Experience of an Internet Expert Forum
on Infertility, available at http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid=1550645 (last visited
Jan. 15, 2011).
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no doubt that some people get the initial idea to pursue ART activities from the
Internet. 74
Second, the Internet fosters the idea that ART is not limited to any traditional
audience. Originally IVF was for married women under the age of 35 who suffered
specific physiological problems and could not conceive naturally. 75 The Internet makes
ART developments available to broader constituencies. Prominent user groups now
include non-married, career heterosexual women, 76 gay 77 or lesbian 78 couples,
individuals, 79 and straight single men. 80 The Internet also cultivates the development of
“radical” ART concepts. 81

74

See Want to Buy My Eggs for $4,000?, available at
http://www.sgclub.com/singapore/eggs_4000_china_188402.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). While there
are no documented cases, it is difficult to believe that ideas such as purchasing embryos, much less
designer embryos, and becoming a surrogate were not created by people doing online research in areas
ranging from “infertility” to simple current events.

75

See, e.g., Liza Mundy, EVERYTHING CONCEIVABLE: HOW ASSISTED REPRODUCTION IS CHANGING OUR
WORLD, 27 (1st ed. 2007) (“We limited our cases at first to those women who had had their Fallopian tubes
removed…”)
76

See Deborah Apton, More Women Choosing Single Motherhood, available at
http://abcnews.go.com/Nightline/story?id=1995278&page=1 (last visited Jan. 15, 2011)
(“California Cryobank, one of the largest sperm banks in the country, reports that single women make up
32 % of the clients who buy sperm from its bank.”).

77

There is a gay men’s baby boom developing fed by the Internet See Stephen H. Miller, Gay Men’s Baby
Boom, available at http://www.indegayforum.org/news/show/26805.html) (last visited Aug. 9, 2009). See
also Guy Ringer, M.D., Gay Man, Gay Dad: Gay Men Can Become Fathers, available at
http://www.theafa.org/library/article/gay_man_gay_dad_gay_men_can_become_fathers/ (last visited Aug.
9, 2009).
78

See Paula Amato, M.D. & Marcy Casey Jacob, M,D., Providing Fertility
Services to Lesbian Couples: The Lesbian Baby Boom (2004), available at
http://www.srmjournal.org/article/S1546-2501(04)00106-9/fulltext (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (“Thirty to
50% of lesbian women of child-bearing age wish to become parents, and given the current social trends
toward same-sex marriage, many will seek to do so with the help of a sperm donor.”) There are clinics that
market services specifically to lesbian couples and individuals. See, e.g.,
http://www.thiemd.com/infertility.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). See also http://www.coparentmatch.com/sperm_donors/lesbian_sperm_donors.php (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
79

See Berke, supra note 28.

80

Id.

81

See, e.g., Martin, supra n. 58 (discussing the Abraham Center, the “World’s First Embryo Bank” who
marketed its services, and attracted clients, online. The Center was based in Texas. Its first two successful
procedures involved women from Canada and California and quickly gained potential clients from
England).
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Third, the Internet is epicenter of the idea of Reproductive Tourism (“RT”). While
authors discuss the concept of RT differently, 82 here it means “citizens of one country
using reproductive technologies in another.” Commentators address restrictions driving
RT users across borders (such as situations where treatment is unavailable 83 or
procedures are locally illegal), 84 but users pursue RT for a variety of reasons 85 including
lack of local medical expertise, lengthy waiting lists, 86 cost considerations, 87 and

82

See, e.g., Guido Pennings, Legal Harmonization and Reproductive Tourism in Europe, 19 Human
Reproduction 2689, 2990 (2004) (“…the practice of citizens leaving their home country for another in
hopes of receiving treatment that has been banned in their home country, typically for safety or moral
reasons”). The basis of this definition likely comes from Bartha M. Knoppers & Sonia LeBris, Recent
Advances in Medically Assisted Conception: Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues, 17 Am. J.L. & Med. 329,
333 (1991) (defining “procreative tourism” as people traveling to exercise “…personal reproductive
choices in less restrictive states.”)
83

Sometimes procedures are “unavailable” because medical personnel simply refuse to perform them. See,
e.g., Andrea D. Gurmankin et al., Screening Practices and Beliefs of Reproductive Technology Programs,
83 Fertility & Sterility 61 (2005) (survey reporting that one in five treatment providers refuse treatment to
unmarried women); Catherine DeLair, Ethical, Moral, Economic and Legal Barriers to Assisted
Reproductive Technologies Employed by Gay Men and Lesbian Women, 4 DePaul J. Health Care L. 147,
150 (2000) (“The most common and the most significant barrier that gays and lesbians face when trying to
access reproductive technologies is physician discrimination and refusal to provide treatment.”). In addition
to direct discrimination – refusal to provide treatment, same-sex couples face statutes that prohibit
insurance payments for in-vitro procedures unless for instance, the treatment is rendered upon their lawful
spouse. See States Summary of Legislation Related to Infertility Insurance Coverage, available at
http://www.ncsl.org/default.aspx?tabid=14391 (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
84

“[R]egulation that is overly restrictive towards the practice of surrogacy has not eliminated the practice.
Rather it has boosted demand for [reproductive] tourism.” See supra note 33, at 285.

85

See Elizabeth Ferrari Morris, Reproductive Tourism and the Role of the European Union, 8 Chi. J. Int’l L
701, 703 (2008). For a comprehensive discussion see supra note 74, at 71.

86

See A Growing Number of Brits Cross the Atlantic for Donor Egg IVF Treatment at Shady Grove
Fertility Center, PR NEWSWIRE, June 16, 2009, available at
http://news.prnewswire.com/ViewContent.aspx?ACCT=109&STORY=/www/story/06-162009/0005044891&EDATE (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (“In the UK, where egg donors are neither paid nor
guaranteed anonymity, donor eggs are scarce, wait times can be as long as three years and choice of donor
is limited.”) Some clinics exist precisely because countries have more demand than supply. See, e.g.,
Shady Grove Fertility, available at http://www.shadygrovefertility.com/international (last visited Jan. 15,
2011).
87

Fertility treatments in foreign countries may be significantly cheaper. As an example, the average cost for
a cycle of IVF is $10,500 in the United States. That same treatment costs $5,100 in Cyprus, $4,200 in
Argentina, and almost 80% less, $2,200, in India. See http://www.visitandcare.com/infertility-treatmentabroad/guides/treatment/ivf-with-sperm-donation/cost (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). Prospective users can
comparison shop online utilizing estimated costs and user reviews. See, e.g., You are Comparing IVF (InVitro Fertilization) Traveling from the USA, available at
http://www.allmedicaltourism.com/usa/fertility/ivf-in-vitro-
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convenience. 88 RT is a prevalent, 89 and based on growth patterns, soon to be an enormous
ART/Internet consideration because the Internet “facilitates nearly all facets of medical
tourism.” 90
It is almost impossible to fathom the future explosion of RT but, while data is limited,
the projections for India provide some perspective. In 2003, India’s Finance Minister
announced his country’s goal to become a “global health destination.” 91 An estimated
150,000 medical tourists visited India in 2005, but that number was projected to increase
to 450,000 by 2008. 92 Perhaps more telling is that India’s RT segment of medical tourism
was approximately $450 million per year in 2006 and is projected to grow by 600% in the
near future. 93 A significant portion of this growth is attributable to the Internet,
specifically user-friendly websites 94 and effective, although not necessarily reliable, 95
fertilization/?mic=m62tl88kjf&gclid=CNmwwYWOrpwCFQMNDQodIWSM7w (last visited Jan. 15,
2011).
88

Foreign clinics use online promotions to target frazzled, infertile couples with an attractive combination:
fertility treatments and vacation. See e.g., My IVF Alternative, available at
http://www.myivfalternative.com/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2011) (offering “vacation style” IVF procedures in
the Czech Republic); Go Sculptura, available at
http://www.ivfmexicoexperts.com/conversion/mexico_conv_fertility.htm?OVRAW=IVF%20Vacation&O
VKEY=ivf%20abroad&OVMTC=advanced&OVADID=44419002522&OVKWID=220392856522) (last
visited Jan. 15, 2011) (offering a “pleasurable” IVF vacation experience in Mexico).

89

“Reproductive Tourism has become an unmistakable part of the European landscape.” See supra note 87,
at 712.
90

See supra note 74, at 85.

91

See Rupa Chinai & Rahul Goswami, Medical Visas Mark Growth of Indian Medical Tourism, 85 Bull of
World Health Org. 161 (2007), available at www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/85/3/07-010307/en/index.html
(last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
92

Id.

93

See Usha Rengachary Smerdon, The Baby Market: Crossing Bodies, Crossing Borders: International
Surrogacy Between the United States and India, 39 Cumb. L. Rev. 15, 24 (2008); Linda F. Powers,
Leveraging Medical Tourism, THE SCIENTIST, Mar. 2006, at 79.

94

See supra note 73, at 85-86:
Virtually every hospital that caters to foreign patients has an English Web site.
And these Web sites are increasingly functional. Many allow patients to
schedule treatments, book hotels and airfare, and even contact their surgeon.
Patients can also find medical tourism brokers on the Internet that will liaise with
foreign hospitals and make travel arrangements.

95

See supra note 94, at 30:
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online advertising. 96 The United States, while not attempting to grow RT as India, still
has a $3 billion dollar per year industry97 and many domestic physicians are increasingly
embracing aspects of RT. 98
IV. Regulation 99
“[T]he plain fact is that medical technologies have raced ahead of the law
without the heed of the general public or legislators.” 100
In this section we examine international, federal, state, and voluntary association
regulation, or lack thereof, regarding embryo donation and surrogacy services. While it
would be convenient to address the same directives at each level, we do not have that
luxury as regulation ranges from chaotic to non-existent. Accordingly we are left
attempting to address two general, but significant, topics in each of the following
subsections. First, is there embryo “regulation” and, if so, what is regulated? Second, is
there surrogacy “regulation” and, if so, what is regulated?
A. INTERNATIONAL LAW
There is little international regulation of human embryos. What does exist primarily
focuses on the length of time embryos can be stored. Storage may be prohibited

Many Indian ART practitioners and fertility tourism agencies have created websites
that “are designed to function as marketing tools for medical tourism, to attract
patients from around the world to India and more importantly, to the clinic. It is
difficult to distinguish actual information from marketing strategies, as the two
often appear to be indistinguishable”. Id. at 30.
96
“Between 2004 and 2006, the number of websites advertising ART more than quadrupled with marketing
heavily geared to foreigners.” Id. at 24.
97

See Mundy, supra note 76, at 4.

98

See supra note 36 (“Robert Rupak, president of PlanetHospital, a California-based medical-tourism
country, says that in the first eight months of [2009] he sent 600 couples or single parents overseas for
surrogacy, nearly three times the number in 2008 and up from just 33 in 2007.”)
99

While we will discuss aspects of embryo regulation in this section, we will not address specific stem cell
issues as those are beyond the scope of this article.
100

See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 9B U.L.A. (as amended 2002) (UPA 2002), comment on Art. 8, Gestational
Agreement, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/final2002.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2011).
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entirely, 101 limited to one-year, 102 two-years, 103 three-years, 104 five-years, 105 ten-years, 106
or unlimited. 107
There is more developed surrogacy regulation, both by action and inaction. Some
countries flatly prohibit it; 108 others regulate surrogacy by prohibiting compensation to
surrogates, 109 while still others allow surrogate compensation. 110 Many countries, likely
even most, have no national regulation. 111
B. FEDERAL LAW
101

That country is Italy. It also bans the use of donor egg or sperm and prohibits freezing embryos for later
use. See Healthy Living, available at www.hc-sc.gc.ca/hl-vs/reprod/hc-sc/general/international-eng.php
(last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
102

Austria and Denmark. See Embryo Bank, available at www.ivf-worldwide.com/Education/embryobank.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2011).
103

Belarus, the Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland, and the Ukraine. Id.

104

Norway and Sweden. Id.

105

Belgium, Croatia, France, Iceland, and the United Kingdom. Id.

106

Finland, Israel, and Spain. Id.

107

Such as the United States. Id.

108

Austria, China, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Slovenia, Sweden,
Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Vietnam. See IVF-Surrogacy (Worldwide) available at
www.ivf-woldwide.com/Education/surrogacy-rw.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
109

Australia, Canada, Denmark, Greece, Netherlands, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. Id.

110

India, Russia, Ukraine, Pakistan (Id.) and Israel (see Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception:
Fertility Tourists, Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 Hastings L.J. 295 (2005).
111
Argentina, Belgium, Brazil, Columbia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia,
Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, South Korea, Thailand, United States,
Uruguay, Venezuela (see supra n. 110) and Ireland (see Eric Scott Sills and Clifford M. Healy, Building
Irish Families Through Surrogacy: Medical and Judicial Issues for the Advanced Reproductive
Technologies, available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2585562/ (last visited Dec. 30,
2010).
This simply means there is nothing preventing commercial surrogacy in these countries; certainly some
provide such services. See, e.g., The Latest About Surrogacy in South Africa, available at
http://www.prlog.org/10512636-the-latest-about-surrogacy-in-south-africa.html (last visited Jan. 4, 2011);
Surrogacy and Adoption in Thailand, available at http://www.hg.org/article.asp?id=19371 (last visited Jan.
4, 2011); Womb for Hire, available at http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/special-report/06/16/09/womb-hirepart-1 (last visited Jan. 4, 2010) (discussing the first commercial surrogacy in the Philippines). It is also
possible that there is some regulation at the state or territorial levels. See, e.g., supra note 102 (discussing
regulation in Australia and noting that Victoria prohibits compensated surrogacy and Queensland prohibits
all surrogacy.).
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One author asserts that there are federal laws requiring “strict medical and genetic
screenings of the [embryo] donating couple to determine the embryo’s viability and
whether the couple is ‘free of any genetic and communicable diseases.’” 112 If such
comprehensive legislation exists, we cannot find it. In fact the opposite is possible; there
may be no federal laws address embryo donor screening. We contend that statutory
language and commentary demonstrates there is some embryo screening and storage
legislation, though it is minimal.
The federal government oversees assisted reproduction and genetic testing through
three agencies: the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), the Centers for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (“CMS”), 113 and the Center for Disease Control (“CDC”). The
FDA’s term “other reproductive tissue” should encompass embryos. 114 Even if that is
correct, there are no more than two regulations regarding embryo collection and storage.
The first merely mandates that all “establishments” engaged in the collection, processing,
storage and distribution of human embryos have their donors screened and tested for
H.I.V., Hepatitis B & C, Chlamydia trachomatis and Neisseria gonorrhea. 115 The second

112

See Alexia M. Baiman, Cryopreserved Embryos as America’s Prospective Adoptees: Are Couples Truly
“Adopting” or Merely Transferring Property Rights?, 16 Wm. & Mary J. of Women & L. 133, 138 (2009).

113

Laboratory testing is largely governed by the CMS. See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.55, .80 (2006).

114

See 21 C.F.R. § 1271.3(d)(3):
Human cells, tissues, or cellular or tissue-based products (HCT/Ps) means articles containing or
consisting of human cells or tissues that are intended for implantation, transplantation, infusion,
or transfer into a human recipient. Examples of HCT/Ps include, but are not limited to, bone,
ligament, skin, dura mater, heart valve, cornea, hematopoietic stem/progenitor cells derived from
peripheral and cord blood, manipulated autologous chondrocytes, epithelial cells on a synthetic
matrix, and semen or other reproductive tissue (emphasis added).

See also Human Tissue Intended for Transplantation, 21 C.F.R. § 1270 (2000); Human Cells, Tissues, and
Cellular and Tissue-Based Products; Establishment Registration and Listing, 66 Fed. Reg. 5447 (Jan. 19,
2001) (codified at 21 C.F.R. § 1271.1 et seq. (2005):
Several comments questioned the need for the regulation of reproductive cells and tissues, citing
current oversight from professional organizations, other Federal agencies, and States. Comments
opposed registration for programs involved in egg donation, egg retrieval, semen processing,
semen evaluation, or in vitro fertilization (IVF) in assisted reproductive technologies.
We stand by our decision to extend regulatory requirements to reproductive cells and tissue.
115

21 C.F.R. § 1271.85(a), (c) (2006).
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states only that human tissue must be stored at an “appropriate temperature.” 116 While
these regulations are nominal and vague, such deficiencies might be explained by
accidental over-sight, but the federal government had an opportunity to clearly establish
embryo quality control regulation and chose not do so.
The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act of 1992 (“FCSRCA”)
authorized the Secretary of Health and Human Services to issue regulations establishing
certification standards and procedures for embryo laboratories. 117 The Act defined an
“embryo laboratory” as “a facility in which human oocytes and sperm, or embryos, are
subject to ART laboratory procedures.” 118 However nothing in the FCSRCA establishes
standards or procedures for quality control practices; instead it only requires that fertility
clinics report annual ART success rates. 119 In sum, if there is any federal embryo quality
control regulation, it is minimal 120 and this minimal level is intentional.
There is no federal surrogacy legislation 121 but there is one possibility in terms of
“national” scope, the Uniform Parentage Act (“UPA”). The most recent incarnation of
that Act was in 2002 (“UPA2002”). 122 That Act recognized the need for clarification
regarding parentage and surrogacy. 123 UPA 2002 mandated that surrogacy agreements
116

21 C.F.R. § 1271.260(2)(b).

117

See DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FERTILITY CLINIC SUCCESS RATE AND CERTIFICATION ACT OF 1992; Proposed
Model Program for the Certification of Embryo Laboratories, 60178, available at
http://wwwn.cdc.gov/dls/art/fr06no98n.txt (last visited Jan. 15, 2011).
118

Id. at 60181.

119

See 42 U.S.C. §§ 263a-1 to -7 (2009). The Act has been termed by one author as “…governmental
regulation at is weakest”. See Brenda Reddis-Smalls, Assessing the Markey for Human Reproductive Tissue
Alienability: Why Can We Sell Our Eggs, but Not Our Livers?, 10 Vand. J. Ent. & Tech. L. 643, 658
(2008). It is hard to dispute this contention. To give perspective, in addition to its failure to establish quality
control procedures, it was not even funded until four years after enactment. Id.
120

At least one author flatly contends there is none. See Helen M. Alvare, The Case for Regulating
Collaborative Reproduction: A Children’s Rights Perspective, 40 Harv. J. on Legis. 1, 28 (2003).
121

See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Gestation: Work for Hire or the Essence of Motherhood? A Comparative
Legal Analysis, 9 Duke J. Gender L. & Policy 91, 103 (2002).
122

See generally supra note 100, UNIF. PARENTAL ACT 9B U.L.A (AS AMENDED 2002), comment on Art. 8,
GESTATIONAL AGREEMENTS, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/upa/final2002.htm
(last visited Jan. 7, 2011).
.
123
See generally supra note 100, UPA 2002, Comment on Art. 7 CHILD OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTION,
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were not void per se, 124 defined that a surrogate may be paid for her services, 125 and
clarified that gestational surrogate services were not “baby selling.” 126 It further specified
that the intended parents of a child born pursuant to an approved surrogacy agreement
were, with judicial approval, the legal parents of the child. 127 While ambitious, the Act
does not provide definitive guidance. To date only nine states enacted it, none of them
without change, 128 and at least two of those states did not adopt Article 8, the provision
addressing gestational agreements. 129 There is no case law interpreting UPA 2002 and its
comments.
C. STATE LAW
There is very little specific state embryo regulation and what does exist is inconsistent
and frequently nebulous. Few states have attempted, or are attempting, to define the legal
status of embryos. 130 That status is a particularly compelling issue on many levels but, for

([T]housands of children are born each year pursuant to [surrogacy] agreements. One thing is clear, a child
born under these circumstances is entitled to have its status clarified.”)
124

See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 9B U.L.A. (AS AMENDED 2002), at comment following §801.

125

Id. at § 801(e).

126

See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 9B U.L.A. (AS AMENDED 2002), at comment following §801.

127

Id. at comment following §807. However, if the gestational agreement is not judicially validated, the
gestational mother is the legal mother. See UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 9B U.L.A. (AS AMENDED 2002) at
comment following §809.
128

Alabama, Delaware, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming
(citations omitted). See CSG Approves Two Uniform Acts as “Suggested State Legislation”, available at
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopModules/NewsDisplay.aspx?ItemID=213 (last visited Jan. 15,
2011). The first draft of a “Model Act” has also been published. See Sara Cotton et al., Model Assisted
Reproductive Technology Act, 9 J. Gender, Race & Just. 55 (2005). To our knowledge it has not yet been
reduced to final form or adopted by any state.
129

130

See Del. Code Ann. Tit. 13, 801-819 (2004); Wyo. Stat. Ann. 14-2-401 to -907 (2005).

However 38 states have “fetal homicide” statutes; laws that punish people who kill a pregnant women
and cause the death of her fetus. See Fetal Homicide, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/health/fethom.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2011). Of those, 21
apply to the earliest stages of pregnancy. Id. This indicates that, while such states have not statutorily
recognized embryos as human beings, embryos are not always property. On a potentially related note, a
New York appellate court recently ruled that a boy, in utero when his father was killed, had standing to
bring a wrongful death action. See Ashby Jones, Unusual New York Wrongful Death Suit Allowed to Move
Forward, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2010/12/09/unusual-new-york-wrongful-death-suit-
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purposes of this article, one aspect is critical. If embryos are “people,” they cannot be
bought or sold. 131 If they are “property,” disposition can be contracted like other
goods. 132 This distinction seems to warrant not just regulation, but a comprehensive and
consistent body of rules. Unfortunately, developed regulation is sparse and, where it does
exist, embryos may be people, property, or something in between.
Louisiana designates embryos as legal persons, 133 while pending Georgia legislation
declares that embryo life begins at the single-cell stage and that embryos have rights and
responsibilities under state law. 134 New Mexico gives embryos the status of “fetus” by its
broad statutory definition 135 and Missouri law is that “the life of each human being
begins at conception.” 136 At the other end of the continuum Michigan recently passed a
statute treating some embryos as property 137 and Florida law grants sperm and egg
donors joint decision-making regarding embryo disposition.138 At common law, Texas

allowed-to-move-forward/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2011). This case also indicates that the un-born have some
legal rights.
131
See Paige C. Cunningham, Embryo Adoption or Embryo Donation?: The Distinction and its
Implications, Center for Bioethics & Human Dignity, Apr. 16, 2003 available at
http://cbhd.org/content/embryo-adoption-or-embryo-donation-distinction-and-its-implications (last visited
Jan. 6, 2011).
132

Id.

133

See L.A. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:123 (1986). Interestingly, in the same year that Louisiana enacted this
law, the United States Supreme Court was clear that it had never implied that an embryo or fetus was a
human being. See Thornbury v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 779 (1986)
(“No Member of this Court has ever suggested that a fetus is a ‘person’ within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”) (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court has not re-visited the issue in the quartercentury since.
134

See Georgia Passes Nation’s First Embryo Adoption Law, available at
http://www.thevoicemagazine.com/headline-news/headline-news/georgia-passes-nations-first-embryoadoption-law.html (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). The text of the law is available at
http://www.legis.state.ga.us/legis/2009_10/fulltext/hb388.htm (last visited Dec. 10, 2010). The Governor
had not signed the bill at the time this article was drafted.
135

See N.M. STAT. § 24-9A-3 (2008) (the statute defines a “fetus” as “the product of conception from the
time of conception until the expulsion or extraction of the fetus or the opening of the uterine cavity.”).
136

See § 1.205 R.S.MO. (2010).

137

See Shari Roan, Obama Victory Delights, available at
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/booster_shots/2008/11/obama-victory-d.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
138

See FLA. STAT. § 742.17(2) (2009).
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treats embryos as property by allowing contract law to determine disposition. 139 It
appears that Maine, Massachusetts, North Dakota, and Pennsylvania statutorily recognize
a special “interim” status making embryos more than property but less than human 140
and, while Tennessee has not codified such status, its Supreme Court held that “[Embryos
are] not, strictly speaking, either ‘persons’ or ‘property’, but occupy an interim category
that entitles them to special respect because of their potential for human life.” 141 While
there is little definitive status regulation, there is even less regarding the sale of human
embryos. Louisiana 142 and Florida 143 statutorily prohibit such transactions, while Virginia
exempts human ovum from its statutory restriction on the sale of human body parts. 144
It may appear fortunate that more states have surrogacy regulation, at least as
compared to embryo regulation, but more is not better 145 when it lacks consistency.
Current state regulation primarily addresses two frequently inter-related areas. The first is
the enforceability of surrogacy agreements themselves. Some states prohibit certain
139

See, e.g., Roman v. Roman, 193 S.W.2d 40, 49-50 (Tex. App. 2006). But see Jodi L. Bender, Snowflakes
in Texas? Enacting Legislation to Allow for Embryo Adoption, 16 Tex. Wesleyan L. Rev. 413, 414 (2010)
(arguing that “But, in recent years, the courts and legislature have gradually moved in the direction of
giving embryos the legal status of a person.”) The author contends that Texas should adopt an “interim”
status and “…suggests that Texas enact laws that will place a frozen embryo in a unique category not as a
person, but as a special kind of property deserving of extraordinary respect.” Id. at 415.
The author made that contention in a 2010 article. It does not appear accurate. In 2007 the Texas House
of Representatives had the opportunity to address HB 1703. That Act would have, in pertinent part,
defined a human embryo as a “a genetically complete living organism of the species Homo [S]apien, from
the single-cell zygote stage to eight weeks’ development.” Further, the bill would have defined “embryo
trafficking” as “…creating a human embryo using in vitro fertilization for the purpose of selling, buying, or
transferring for valuable consideration the human embryo to a person who is not a genetic parent of the
embryo or the spouse of the genetic parent.” Id. See HOUSE COMM. ON STATE AFFAIRS, BILL ANALYSIS,
Tex. H.B. 1703, 8th Leg. R.S. (2007). The bill apparently expired during session. See
http://www.thbi.com/storage/pdf-files/end_of_session_report_80.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2011). There is no
record of similar proposed legislation since. We are more than a little surprised that this legislation died so
quietly as it was clearly in response to the formation of the highly controversial Abraham Life Center in
San Antonio in 2006. See supra note 55.
140

See Baiman, supra note 112, at 145.

141

Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (1992).

142

See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (LexisNexis2006).

143

See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05 (LexisNexis 2006).

144

See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1 (LexisNexis 2006).

145

As succinctly summarized by one author, “The law of surrogate motherhood in the United States is in a
state of flux and confusion.” See Carla Spivack, SECTION IIA: CIVIL LAW: The Law of Surrogate
Motherhood in the United States, 58 Am. J. Comp. 97, 97 (2010).
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surrogacy agreements completely, 146 some limit agreements, 147 while still others
recognize the enforceability of surrogacy contracts. 148 The second area is surrogate
compensation. The approach here, again, differs. Some states refuse to enforce surrogacy
agreements if the surrogate receives compensation for her services 149 or make only
altruistic surrogacy legal. 150 Other jurisdictions prohibit payment to intermediaries used
to help provide surrogates, 151 thus likely decreasing the number of potential surrogates
actually available. 152 The end result is that, similar to state embryo regulation, state level
surrogacy regulation varies greatly, in the oft chance it exists at all. 153
D. VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS
Two entities promulgate aspects of voluntary embryo regulation, the American Bar
Association (“ABA”) and a consortium featuring the American Society for Reproductive
Medicine (“ASRM”). The ABA formally adopted its Model Act Governing Assisted
Reproductive Technology (“Model Act”) in 2008. The Model Act defines an “embryo”
as “a cell or group of cells containing a diploid complement of chromosomes or groups of

146

See State by State Surrogacy Laws, available at http://www.rainbowlaw.com/surrogacy-adoption-andivf/188-state-by-state-surrogacy-laws) (last visited Jan. 3, 2010). Examples include Delaware, Indiana,
Louisiana, Michigan, New York, New Jersey, and the District of Columbia.
147

Examples include Nevada, New Hampshire, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, and Virginia. Id.

148

Examples include California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Ohio. Id. For a related
discussion see Radhika Rao, SURROGACY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES: THE OUTCOME OF AMBIVALENCE IN
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 23 (Rachel Cook, et al. eds., 2003).
149

See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(4) (WEST 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2713(A) (WEST
2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21,200 (2005); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(1) (McKinney 2006); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 48-10-102(a) (2006); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.26.230 (2006).
150

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.212(1)(h) (2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.045 (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 168-B:16(IV) (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B)(2); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-162(A) (2005).
151

See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 25-218(A) (2006); D.C. CODE § 16-402(b) (2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
199.590(4) (2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:16(IV) (2006); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 123(2)(b)
(McKinney 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-165(A) (2006).

152

At least one state takes a slightly different approach and regulates issues such as parental status in
surrogacy relationships. See 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 47/1-75 (2006).
153

For further discussion regarding the status of surrogacy laws by state see supra note 146 at 101-102;
Surrogacy Laws by State, available at http://www.allaboutsurrogacy.com/surrogacylaws.htm (last visited
Dec. 30, 2010).
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such cells (not gamete or gametes) that has the potential to develop into a live-born
human being if transferred into the body of a woman under conditions in which gestation
may be reasonably expected to occur.” 154 This appears to fall into the “interim”
classification previously discussed 155 as the embryo is not life, but has the potential to
develop into human life. The Model Act also calls for donation regulation addressing
such issues as relinquishment of future parental and inheritance rights 156 and donor
screening prior to donation. 157 It is unclear if any person or entity adopted the Model Act.
The ASRM is “…a voluntary, non-profit organization devoted to advancing
knowledge and expertise in reproductive medicine, including infertility, menopause,
contraception, and sexuality.” 158 It is “…the leading market force in the field of
reproductive medicine.” 159 The Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (SART) is
“…the primary organization of professionals dedicated to the practice of assisted
reproductive technologies (ART) in the United States.” 160 “SART is extensively involved
in data collection, practice guidelines and standards, government interaction, quality
assurance, and research.” 161 SART is also comprehensively involved with a wide variety
of entities that have significant ART interests and concerns. 162 ASRM and SART, along
154

See AM. BAR ASS'N MODEL ACT GOVERNING ASSISTED REPROD. TECH. § 102(1) (2008), available at
http://www.abanetorg/family/committees/artmodelact.pdf (last visited Jan. 6, 2010).
155

See supra note 140.

156

See supra note 154, at § 102(9).

157

See Charles P. Kindregan, Jr. and Steven H. Snyder, Clarifying the Law of ART: The New American Bar
Association Model Act Governing Assisted Reproductive Technology, 42 Fam. L.Q. 203, 214 (2008).
158

See Welcome to the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, available at http://asrm.org/ (last
visited Aug. 2, 2009).
159

See Reddis-Smalls, supra note 119, at 673.

160

See Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology, available at
http://www.sart.org/detail.aspx?id=1864 (last visited Feb. 1, 2011).
161

See Reddis-Smalls, supra note 119, at 675.

162

See David Adamson, Regulation of Assisted Reproduction Technologies in the United States, 39 Fam.
L.Q. 727, 735 (2005):
[B]oth SART and ASRM have continued to cooperate with and lead initiatives with other
organizations and institutions that are stakeholders in ART. These include the CDC, FDA, NIH,
FTC, and members of Congress as well as professional organizations such as the American
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with the College of American Pathologists (“COP”) created the Reproductive Laboratory
Accreditation Program (RLAP). 163 That program proffers standards for reproductive
laboratories and performs on-site accreditation every two years. 164 SART represents 85%
of the clinics practicing ART in the United States 165 and as of 2005, two-thirds of SART
programs were RLAP accredited. 166 ASRM appears to adopt an “interim” embryo status
position, “while an embryo deserves greater respect than accorded other human tissue,
since it has the potential to become a human person, it is not accorded the respect of an
actual human being.” 167 This standing would seem to dictate heightened standards for
embryo laboratories, but that is not the case. The RLAP directives do not discuss embryo
donation or storage specifically and they leave particular procedures to the individual
facilities. 168 This is problematic as fertility clinic’s voluntary procedures vary
tremendously 169 and may not be followed at all. 170 While there is very little voluntary
embryo regulation, there is no voluntary surrogate regulation, other than entity specific
standards such as screening. 171

Medical Association (AMA), American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), the
American Bar Association (ABA) and consumer organizations, RESOLVE, the National Fertility
Organization, and the American Fertility Association (AFA).
SART even conducts its compliance visits in conjunction with the FDA. See Reddis-Smalls, supra note
119, at 674.
163

See Adamson, supra note 162, at 732-33.

164

Id.

165

See supra note 160.

166

Id.

167

See ETHICS COMM. OF THE AM. FERTILITY SOC’Y, Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive
Technologies, 46 Fertility & Sterility 30, (Sept. 1986).
168

Instead of identifying particular processes or procedures, the Standards speak in general terms. See, e.g.,
supra note 160, at 4. “There must be a manual(s) in the laboratory describing all procedures in sufficient
detail to assure reproductibility and competence in the handling of gametes.”

169

See Alvare, supra note 120, at 12.

170

See CENTER FOR GENETICS AND SCIENCE, Possible Federal Oversight for the New Human
Biotechnologies, Opportunities for the New Administration, 4, (Jan. 2009), available at
http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/downloads/CGSObama.pdf.
171

See infra notes. 218-19.
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V. BECOMING OR UTILIZING A “CYBER PARENT” 172
A. POTENTIAL PARENTAL RIGHTS
There are three common classifications of reproductive tissue donors, “known,” 173
“unknown” 174 and “identified.” 175 Most embryo donorship is unknown as the recipients
never know the identity of the donor(s). 176 When donor identity is unknown the donor
has no parental rights, so it is unlikely (although not impossible) 177 that an embryo donor
would have parental rights. Surrogates may have a very different legal position.
Surrogacy can create very strong ties between the surrogate and the resulting child 178
and disputes can arise over custody. The fundamental question at issue is whether

172

“A person who provides, online, human reproductive materials he or she biologically produced.”

173

There is not yet any case law on point addressing embryo donorship so we borrow from the well
established case law regarding sperm donation. A “known” sperm donor’s identity is known to the
prospective mother. Courts tend to order child support more often from known donors, regardless of any
intent of the adult parties. See, e.g., Phillips v. Irons, No. 1-03-2992, 2005 WL 4694579 (Ill. App. 1 Dist.
2005) (support ordered for child conceived after woman self-inseminated following oral sex); S.F. v. State
ex rel T.M., 695 So. 2d 1186 (Ala. Civ. App. 1996) (support ordered for child conceived when father was
passed out drunk); Faske v. Bonanno, 357 N.W.2d 860, 861 (Mich. App. 1984) (disallowing
misrepresentation of contraceptive protection as a defense).
174

An “unknown” or “anonymous” sperm donor is one whose identity or other personal contact
information is undisclosed to either the prospective mother or the child.
175

An “identified” sperm donor donates understanding that any resulting child is given the donor’s personal
contact information and personal identification (name, address, city of birth, date of birth, etc) once the
child reaches the age of 18.
176

See, e.g., Rotunda Fertility Clinic's Adoption Policies, available at
http://iwannagetpregnant.com/embryo.asp (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) (clinic handles embryo “adoption”
like a closed adoption, with no contact between the parties).
177

However it is possible, particularly in a designer embryo purchase, that the true parent(s) could be
known as suppliers would likely want aspects of parentage known so as to increase value of the embryo. It
is also probable that the parent(s) would be known in a donation that involves no embryo supplier,
although, these are likely to be quite rare.
178

See Sarah Terman, Marketing Motherhood: Rights and Responsibilities of Egg Donors in Assisted
Reproductive Technology Agreements, 3 N.W. J. L. & Soc. Pol’y 167, 169 (2008).

Outsourcing Reproduction:
Embryos & Surrogacy Services in the Cyberprocreation Era

28

surrogates have parental rights over resulting children. The deceptively simple answer is,
perhaps. Courts currently have very little precedent, 179 but a thread may be developing.
The most famous surrogate custody case, and certainly the first to garner strong public
attention, was In the Matter of Baby M. 180 Baby M was a traditional surrogacy case. Mary
Beth Whitehead was artificially inseminated with William Stern's sperm and became the
surrogate mother of the child. 181 Whitehead gave birth to a daughter. 182 Within 24-hours
of transferring custody to the Sterns, Whitehead asked for the baby back and threatened
suicide. 183 She then refused to return the baby to the Sterns and left New Jersey, taking
the infant with her. 184 The New Jersey Superior Court awarded custody of Baby M to the
Sterns. 185
On appeal the Supreme Court of New Jersey invalidated surrogacy contracts as
against public policy, 186 remanding the case to family court. 187 That court awarded
William Stern custody and Mary Beth Whitehead the parental right of visitation. 188 Baby
M is the most famous 189 surrogacy/parental rights case, but it is not dispositive of those

179

See Miriam Perez, Surrogacy: The Next Frontier for Reproductive Justice, available at
http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2010/02/23/surrogacy-next-frontier-reproductive-justice (last visited
Dec. 30, 2010) (“The precedents set by the rare cases that do go to court make up the body of case law that
affects the practice of surrogacy nationwide.”)
180

1988 N.J. LEXIS 1.

181

Id. at nn. 11-12.

182

Id. at n. 12.

183

Id. at nn.13-14.

184

Id. at n. 14.

185

Id. at 18-19.

186

Id. at 25. Recently New Jersey built upon Baby M’s holding in A.G.R. v. D.R.H. & S.H., unpublished
opinion Docket #FD-09-001838-07 (2009) (invalidating a gestational surrogacy contract as it violated
public policy).
187

1988 N.J. LEXIS 105.

188

See In the Matter of Baby M, 225 N.J. Super. 267 (1988).

189

While it is the most famous, it is not the most extreme in terms of result. In Baby M the surrogate was
awarded the parental right of visitation, but there is one case where the surrogate was awarded primary
custody. See Flynn v. Bimber, 2005 Pa. Dist. & Cnty. Dec. LEXIS 188.
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issues in all jurisdictions. In fact, if similar issues arose in another state the result might
be quite different. 190 As examples, Ohio would not invalidate a surrogacy contract under
the theory that such contracts per se violate public policy191 and Massachusetts has
invalidated a surrogacy agreement on public policy grounds 192 but the articulated
concerns were different from those in Baby M and that court recognized that a valid
surrogacy agreement could be created in Massachusetts. 193 While the above cases
focused on public policy, there may be another way to assess the likelihood of surrogate
parental rights; determine who “mom” really is.
Johnson v. Calvert 194 arose out of a dispute regarding a surrogacy contract. Mr.
Johnson’s sperm was mixed with Mrs. Johnson’s eggs and the fertilized eggs were
implanted in the surrogate. 195 Shortly before birth the surrogate threatened to keep the
child unless she was paid monies she contended due under the agreement. 196 Both sides
sought judicial declaration as the lawful parent(s) of the unborn child. 197 The court had
to choose between the biological parents and the birth mother. It held that “…she who
intended to procreate the child – this is, she who intended to bring about the birth of the
child that she intended to raise as her own – is the natural mother.” 198 The end result was
190

At least one author argues that surrogacy regulation should be decided exclusively at the state level. See
Dale Elizabeth Lawrence, Surrogacy in California: Genetic and Gestational Rights, 21 Golden Gate U. L.
Rev. (1991).
191

See, e.g., J.F. v. D.B., et al., 879 N.E.2d 740, 741 (“We conclude, therefore, that Ohio does not have an
articulated public policy against gestational-surrogacy contracts. Consequently, no public policy is violated
when a gestational-surrogacy contract is entered into….”) The court noted that a traditional surrogate
might “…have a different legal position….” Id. at 742. See also S.N. v. M.B., 2010 Ohio LEXIS 1910
(finding a gestational surrogacy contract valid and enforceable).
192

See R.R. v. M.H. & Another, 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998).

193

Id. at 797 (“If no compensation is paid beyond pregnancy-related expenses and if the mother is not
bound by her consent to the father's custody of the child unless she consents after a suitable period has
passed following the child's birth, the objections we have identified in this opinion to the enforceability of a
surrogate's consent to custody would be overcome.”)
194

5 Cal. 4th 84 (1993).

195

Id. at 87.

196

Id. at 88.

197

Id.

198

5 Cal. 4th 84, at 93.
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that the biological mother got custody, not the surrogate. So, California law is clear
about who the true mother is in a surrogacy arrangement. That should then allow us to
conclude that a surrogate has no parental rights, at least in California, but that may not be
true.
There is a potentially critical footnote in Johnson, it states “…in a true ‘egg donation’
situation, where a woman gestates and gives birth to a child formed from the egg of
another woman with the intent to raise the child as her own, the birth mother is the
natural mother under California law (emphasis added).” 199 That means that where there
is no biological link between the “intended” mother and the resulting child, the birth
mother (the surrogate), is the mother. The surrogate would then have full parental rights.
This footnote is significant because, while it was not mandatory authority, a New York
appellate court cited Johnson in McDonald v. McDonald 200 and held that the nonbiological mother, in a true egg donation case, was the lawful mother. 201 Of course it is
possible that the surrogate would not have parental rights if she contacted them away, but
that assumes the applicable state recognizes the validity of surrogacy contracts. That
assumption should not be made. 202 So, does a surrogate have parental rights? Perhaps.

B. POTENTIAL PARENTAL RESPONSIBILITIES

199

Id. at 10.

200

196 A.D.2d 7 (1994).

201

Id. at 12.

202

See supra text acc. notes 147-150 . See also Vanessa S. Browne-Barbour, Bartering for Babies: Are
Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests of Children?, 26 Whittier L. Rev. 429, 445 (2004):
A survey conducted in December 2000 revealed that approximately eleven states
expressly permitted gestational agreements by statute or case law. Six states statutorily
declared such agreements void. Approximately eight states enacted statutes to ban
gestational agreements that pay compensation to the gestational woman . . . [t]he
survey further revealed that courts in two states refuse to recognize gestational agreements.
For further discussion and breakdown see Surrogacy Agreements, available at
http://libguides.law.gsu.edu/content.php?pid=122829&sid=1055848 (last visited Dec. 30, 2010). See also
http://www.thesurrogacyexperience.com/surrogates.cfm?sc=23&p=99 (last visited Dec. 30, 2010).
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Historically, biological parents had financial responsibilities for their children, 203 but
embryo donors would not want such obligations and likely would not have them under
common or statutory law. As previously discussed, most embryo donation is anonymous
because parties contract with fertility clinics to provide them with an embryo; they have
no contact with the donor and do not know the donor’s identity. 204 This makes them
“unknown” donors. Common law is well settled that unknown tissue donors usually have
no parental responsibilities, while known donors do. 205 Twelve states also statutorily
address this issue. 206 The most common position is that a donor is not a parent of a child
conceived by means of assisted reproduction. 207 Additionally, tissue donors may be able
to contract away parental responsibilities, although this approach is far from well
settled. 208 Currently embryo donors are not likely to have parental responsibilities; that
may not be the case for surrogates. 209
As discussed earlier, a surrogate may have parental rights either due to a biological
relationship to the resulting child or because the applicable jurisdiction holds that the
birth mother is the legal mother. 210 If she can have parental rights, it is only logical that
203

See Child Support Laws State by State, available at http://www.child-support-laws-state-bystate.com/child-support.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2010).
204

But see supra note 177.

205

See. e.g., Ferguson v. McKiernen, 60 Pa. D. & C. 4th 353, 364 (Pa. C.P. 2002) (stating the general rule:
“We agree with the defendant that if the use of donors in artificial insemination proceedings is permitted in
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the donor should be protected from [parental] liability to the donee.”)
206

See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-102, 8-702 to -703 (Supp. 2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 742.11, .13-.14,
17 (West 2005); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-122, :124, :126-127, :129-130, :132 (2008); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 168-B:13, :15 (LexisNexis 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-20-02, 14-20-60 to -61 (Supp.
2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.97 (LexisNexis Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 556 (West
2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 160.102, .702-.703, .7031 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 78B-15-102, -702-703 (West 2008); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-156, -158 (Supp. 2008); WASH REV.
CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.011, .705, .710 (West 2005); WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 14-2-402, -902-903 (2007).
207

See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, §§ 8-102, 8-702 to -703 (Supp. 2006).

208

See, e.g., 60 Pa. D. & C.4th 353, 355–6 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2002), aff’d, 855 A.2d. 121 (Pa. 2004), aff’d, 581
Pa. 629, 868 A.2d 378 (Pa. Super. 2005).

209

The opposite may be true as well. If the UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT 9B (as amended 2002) were to be
adopted, specifically Article 8, prospective parents who entered into non-validated surrogacy agreements,
and later refused to “adopt” the resulting child, could be responsible for support of the child. See supra note
100, at ART. 8 GESTATIONAL AGREEMENT, Comment.
210

See supra text accompanying notes 181-203.
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she would have parental responsibilities. It is possible that she might contract those away
but, as previously discussed, surrogacy contracts are not enforceable in all
jurisdictions. 211
VI. POTENTIAL LIABILITY
A. THE EMBRYO BUSINESS
1. WARRANTIES
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) governs the sale of goods. 212 While
there is a great deal of discussion of whether or not human reproductive materials should
be goods, 213 we contend, for purposes of this article, that human embryos are goods. The

211

See supra text accompanying notes 147-150.

212

UCC § 2-102, available at http://www.law.cornell.edu/ucc/2/article2.htm (last Jan. 16, 2011).

213

As we will discuss, human embryos are legally be bought and sold. However, the “properness” of such
transaction is far from settled on an economic theory, ethical, or moral basis. See, e.g., Kenneth Baum,
Golden Eggs: Towards the Rational Regulation of Oocyte Donation, 2001 BYU L. Rev. 107, 162-63
(2001) (“The rationales for the prohibition of the commodification of organs are either internally irrational
or are not applicable to oocyte donation due to its unique technical and social aspects. Additionally,
oocyte-specific arguments misconstrue the potential applications of such technology and fail to conform
with broader social treatments of noncoital reproduction and freedom to contract.”); Gregory Pence, DeRegulating and De-Criminalizing Innovations in Human Reproduction, 39 Cumb. L. Rev. 1, 7 (2009)
(“Public intellectuals ... claim that such innovation wrongly commodifies life. I believe that the opposite is
true: money fueled stupendous breakthroughs in assisted reproduction and such market forces will continue
to be good for babies and for the infertile couples who want them.”); Radhika Rao, Coercion,
Commercialization, and Commodification: The Ethics of Compensation for Egg Donors in Stem Cell
Research, 21 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1055, 1058 (2006) (“Allowing human eggs to be bought and sold ... treats
the sacred components of human life as a form of property, engendering an attitude of disrespect for actual
personn.”); Camille S. Williams, Women, Equality, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 20 BYU J. Pub.
L. 487, 511 (2006) (“In a sense, these transactional procreative arrangements reduce the missing sex to the
products of their reproductive abilities: sperm, ova, gestation, labor, and birth, and the ultimate product of
the transaction, the child, to a commodity.”); see also Matthew H. Baughman, In Search of Common
Ground: One Pragmatist Perspective on the Debate Over Contract Surrogacy, 10 Colum. J. Gender & L.
263, 279-80 (2001) (differentiating contracting to sell and purchase renewable reproductive services from
the concept of selling and purchasing a child); Suriya E.P. Jayanti, Guarantors of Our Genes: Are Egg
Donors Liable for Latent Genetic Disease?, 58 Am. U. L. Rev. 405, 426 (2008) (exploring implications of
viewing donor eggs as commodities on potential product liability tort actions).
Much of the discussion on this topic focuses on whether or not reproductive materials are, or should be,
“property.” See, e.g., Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 Va. L. Rev. 163, 181-82 (2000)
(“Whoever has the power to donate (or refuse to donate) the organ can be said to possess a property right,
albeit it of a limited kind.”); Rao, supra, at 1066 (“Constructing the body as a form of property . . . would
imply not only freedom from physical invasion, but also freedom to instrumentalize the body by
technologically manipulating it or otherwise putting it to productive use.”); Andrew Wancata, No Value for
a Pound of Flesh: Extending Market-Inalienability of the Human Body, 18 J.L. & Health 199, 223 (2004)
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UCC defines “good[s]” as “all things . . . which are movable at the time of identification
to the contract for sale . . . .” 214 Embryos are transported from place to place 215 and
embryos are sold. 216 Embryos are goods and their sale can be governed by the UCC.
a. EXPRESS WARRANTIES
Pursuant to UCC Article 2, any oral or written promise relating to the good at issue
can create an express warranty. 217 Accordingly, statements that an embryo donor was
screened for, or is free from, certain diseases or medical conditions can constitute an
express warranty. Embryo suppliers attempt to distinguish themselves by promoting such
standards in their web advertising, thus creating express warranties. 218

(“Legal scholars and property theorists, as well as judges, have found it very difficult to speak of human
body parts without resorting to masking them in property terminology.”); see generally Elizabeth E. Appel
Blue, Redefining Stewardship over Body Parts, 21 J.L. & Health 75, 85-95 (2008) (contrasting benefits and
shortcomings of viewing body parts as property); R. Alta Charo, Skin and Bones: Post-Mortem Markets in
Human Tissue, 26 Nova L. Rev. 421 424-30 (2002) (examining historical treatments of the market value of
corpses and human tissue).
214

UCC § 2-105.

215

“Movement” occurs when the embryo is implanted into the uterus.

216

See, e.g., California Conceptions, available at
http://www.californiaconceptionn.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=47&Itemid=69
(last visited Jan. 11, 2011)
217

U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) “Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which relates
to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall
conform to the affirmation or promise.”
218

See, e.g., supra note 216 (“All donors who choose to anonymously donate through this program are
thoroughly screened for infectious diseases and meet all state and federal regulation. Donors that provide
embryos have also been screened for health risks including inherited disorders, mental illness, and other
traits that would be undesirable to most parents.”); UCSF Medical Center, available at
http://coe.ucsf.edu/ivf/embryo_donation_program_for_recipient.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2011) (“Donors
are carefully screened by our Embryo Donation Program team. In screening donors, we adhere to the
guidelines from the American Society for Reproductive Medicine, the United States Food and Drug
Administration, and to the university’s institutional ethics board.”)
Unfortunately, it may be that these promises are regularly broken. One study, though dated, revealed that
many physicians failed to adequately screen donors for diseases and many screenings were limited to
merely questioning donors about common familial diseases. See Martin Curie-Cohen et al., Current
Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300 New Eng. J. Med. 585, 586 (1979). It
is possible that physicians have engaged in more rigorous screening in intervening years, but there are few
safeguards to actually ensure such practices. See Kerry Cork, Comment, Test-Tube Parents: Collaborative
Reproduction in Minnesota, 22 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 1535, 1537 (1996).
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Some embryo suppliers also specifically warrant attributes or qualifications of donors
through donor profiles, 219 although they may actually warrant more than they expect.
While suppliers may believe they only promise that a donor has certain characteristics,
they may actually warrant characteristics of a resulting child. An oral or written promise
creates an express warranty, but a sample or model also does so when it is “part of the
basis of the bargain.” 220 If a photograph or biography of a donor constitutes a model, 221
the purchaser may expect the resulting child to have the model’s characteristics. 222 Most
reasonable people recognize that a child’s characteristics may differ greatly from those of
a genetic parent, but it is not well settled that reliance on an express warranty must be
reasonable. 223 Embryo suppliers that fail to meet promised standards of donor screening
219

Most profiles and databases are proprietary and cannot be accessed by the general public. See, e.g.,
Miracles Waiting, available at http://miracleswaiting.org/membersonly3/modules/sections/ (last visited
Jan. 11, 2011). We expect the embryo market to develop similarly to the human egg market. We provide
the following egg examples to give context to what embryo donor advertising is likely to look like.
A link to a sample donor profile form is available at http://www.elitefertility.com/egg-donor-profiledatabase.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2011). For a sense of how many donors may be available see The Egg
Donor Center, available at http://www.theeggdonor.com/egg_donors.php (last visited Jan. 16, 2011) (The
Egg Donor Center Database “…has 6412 prescreened egg donors, 642 interviewed and approved egg
donors, and 18 currently unavailable egg donors on file….”) For a “menu board” of donor photos see Egg
Donations, Inc., available at http://www.eggdonor.com/?page=donordb (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).
220

U.C.C. § 2-313(1):
A seller who makes an affirmation of fact or promise relating to the goods or
who supplies a description, sample or model of the goods that becomes part of
the basis of the bargain makes an express warranty that the goods will conform
to that affirmation of fact, promise, description, sample or model.

221

To our knowledge, no court has decided this specific issue. It is impossible to accurately predict how a
court would likely rule as the UCC provides no guidance for determining what constitutes a model.
222

There is little doubt that reproductive materials sellers want precisely that perception. Sales of athletes’
sperms jumped 150% in one month after the athletes were shown as “Donors of the Month” at California
Cryobank. See E:60 Sperm U, available at http://espn.go.com/video/clip?id=3554822&categoryid=null
(last visited Jan. 16, 2011). See also
http://www.cryobank.com/About-us/Press-Releases/template.cfm?id=1396 (last visited Jan. 16, 2011)
(where customers can shop for donors who look like famous people).
223

For a very comprehensive analysis see James J. White, Freeing the Tortious Soul of Express Warranty
Law, 72 Tul. L. Rev. 2089, at n. 31 (1998):
In many states there are cases taking irreconcilable positions regarding whether reliance
by the buyer is required for express warranty liability. While some cases from each of the
following jurisdictions require reliance, there are others in most of these jurisdictions that
grant recovery without explicitly mentioning reliance. See, for example, in Maryland:
Worm v. American Cyanamid Co., Civ. A. No. HAR 90-1424, 1992 WL 368062 at 5
(D. Md. Nov. 30, 1992) (“The court would have to find that such representations induced
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the Worms to purchase Scepter... Because the literature upon which the plaintiffs
rely did not exist in 1987 and plaintiffs therefore could not have relied on it ... it did
not become part of the basis of the bargain.”); Illinois: Stamm v. Wilder Travel
Trailers, 358 N.E.2d 382, 385 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976) (“Cases under the present day
Commercial Code ... require a reliance by the buyer upon the promise, affirmation
or description.”); cf. Adolphson v. Gardner-Denver Co., 553 N.E.2d 793, 798
(Ill. Ct. App. 1990) (“The trial court was not obligated to accept the plaintiff's
argument that the sales brochure created an express warranty ... given the fact
that Adolphson testified that he did not rely on the sales brochure....”); but see
Weng v. Allison, 678 N.E.2d 1254, 1256 (Ill. App. 1997) (citation omitted) (“The
trial court's ruling that the statements of the seller could not have been part of the
basis of the bargain simply because no reasonable persons could have relied upon
those statements was erroneous. The trial court misconstrued the role of reliance
in determining whether an affirmation of fact or description is part of the basis of
the bargain. Affirmations of fact made during the bargain are presumed to be part
of the basis of the bargain unless clear, affirmative proof otherwise is shown ... It is
not necessary, therefore, for the buyer to show reasonable reliance upon the seller's
affirmation....”); New York: Scaringe v. Holstein, 477 N.Y.S.2d 903, 904 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1984) (citation omitted) (“A necessary element in the creation of an
express warranty is the buyer's reliance upon the seller's affirmations or promises.”);
Pilch, Inc. v. L & L Started Pullets, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 6513 (CSH), 1987 WL 9430,
at 4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1987) (citation omitted) (“In order to succeed on an express
warranty theory under [2-313], it is necessary for the purchaser to plead and prove
that the written promotional literature in question was furnished to buyer prior to
the purchase, and relied upon him [sic] in making the purchase.”); Shapiro Budrow
& Assocs., Inc. v. Microdata Corp., No. 84 Civ. 3589 (CBM), 1986 WL 2756, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1986) (quoting Eddington v. Dick, 386 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181 (City
Court, Geneva County, 1976)) (“In order to make out a cause of action for breach of
express warranty, the buyer must demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, 1)
an affirmation of fact or promise by the seller; 2) the natural tendency of the said
affirmation or promise was to induce the buyer to purchase goods; 3) that the buyer
purchased goods in reliance thereon....'“); cf. Tecnoclima, S.p.A. v. PJC Group of New
York, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 4437 (CSH), 1993 WL 404109, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 1993)
(“The finder of fact could determine that Circle relied on the specifications in assessing
the marketability of the boiler/burner combination. Such a finding would support a
claim for breach of express warranty.”); but see CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publ'g Co., 553
N.E.2d 997, 1001 (N.Y. 1990) (citation omitted) (“This view of “reliance' – i.e., as
requiring no more than reliance on the express warranty as being a part of the bargain
between the parties – reflects the prevailing perception of an action for breach of express
warranty as one that is no longer grounded in tort, but essentially in contract. The
express warranty is as much a part of the contract as any other term. Once the express
warranty is shown to have been relied on as part of the contract, the right [to damages]
for its breach does not depend on proof that the buyer thereafter believed that the
assurances of fact made in the warranty would be fulfilled.”); Rogath v. Siebenmann,
129 F.3d 261, 264 (2d Cir. 1997) (quoting Galli v. Metz, 973 F.2d 145, 151 (2d Cir.
1992) (emphasis in original) (““Where a buyer closes on a contract in the full
knowledge and acceptance of facts disclosed by the seller which would constitute a
breach of warranty under the terms of the contract, the buyer should be foreclosed from
later asserting the breach ... unless the buyer expressly preserves his rights under the
warranties ... On the other hand, if the seller is not the source of the buyer's knowledge,
e.g., if it is merely “common knowledge” that the facts warranted are false ..., the buyer
may prevail in his claim for breach of warranty'“); Massachusetts: Sprague v. Upjohn Co.,
Civ. A. No. 91-40035-NMG, 1995 WL 376934, 3 (D. Mass. May 10, 1994) (citation
omitted) (“In an express warranty claim, plaintiff must show reliance on such warranty.”);
Stuto v. Corning Glass Works, Civ. A. No. 88-1150-WF, 1990 WL 105615, 5 (D. Mass.

35
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would certainly be liable for breaching expressed warranties. Suppliers making a promise
of resulting characteristics through a model, and failing to deliver those characteristics,
may also be liable for such breach.
b. MERCHANTABILITY

July 23, 1990) (“This court believes that some minimum of reliance is a required element
of a breach of express warranty claim....”); cf. Roth v. Bay-Stel's Hair Stylists, Inc.,
470 N.E.2d 137, 138 (Mass. App. 1984) (noting that “the hairdresser testified that he had
read the information printed on the box, and, relying on it, he recommended its use to
Judith Roth”); Hannon v. Original Gunite Aquatech Pools, Inc., 434 N.E.2d 611, 617
(Mass. 1982) (noting that “the trial judge found that Hannon relied on Aquatech's
brochure”); Jacquot v. Wm. Filene's Sons Co., 149 N.E.2d 635, 637 (Mass. 1958)
(noting that “Mrs. Jacquot ... relied upon these express warranties”); but see Wechsler v.
Long Island Rehabilitation Ctr. of Nassau, Inc., No. Civ. A. 93-6946-13, 1996 WL
590679, at 22 (Mass. Super. Ct. Sept. 4, 1996) (“The trustee is not required to establish
that in connection with a specific account receivable it purchased, Towers relied on the
factual truth of each of the representations and warranties; what must be shown is that
Towers relied on the fact of the warranties, that is, the promise itself that the
representations and warranties were true....”); Kentucky: Overstreet v. Norden Lab., Inc.,
669 F.2d 1286, 1291 (6th Cir. 1982) (citation omitted) (“A warranty is the basis of the
bargain if it has been relied upon as one of the inducements for purchasing the product.”);
Nebraska: Vlasin v. Shuey, No. A-91-324, 1993 WL 61875, 1 (Neb. Ct. App. Mar. 9,
1994) (“Nebraska case law has long held that the assertion of a fact or promise by a seller
concerning goods, which is relied upon by the buyer and which tends to induce the buyer
to purchase the goods, is an express warranty.”); Hillcrest Country Club v. N.D. Judds
Co., 461 N.W.2d 55, 61 (Neb. 1990) (citation omitted) (“This court has held that “since
an express warranty must have been “made part of the basis of the bargain,” it is essential
that the plaintiffs prove reliance upon the warranty.'“); Wendt v. Beardmore Suburban
Chevrolet, Inc., 366 N.W.2d 424, 428 (Neb. 1985) (citation omitted) (“Since an express
warranty must have been “made part of the basis of the bargain,' it is essential that the
plaintiffs prove reliance upon the warranty.”); Indiana: Royal Bus. Machs., Inc. v.
Lorraine Corp., 633 F.2d 34, 44 n.7 (7th Cir. 1980) (citation omitted) (“The requirement
that a statement be part of the basis of the bargain in order to constitute an express
warranty “is essentially a reliance requirement....'“); Kansas: Ray Martin Painting, Inc.
v. Ameron, Inc., 638 F. Supp. 768, 772 (D. Kan. 1986) (citation omitted) (“Whether the
statements about the coating ability of the Amerlock created an express warranty depends
on whether they were “part of the basis of the bargain' which, under Kansas law, requires
some type of reliance on the part of the buyer.”); Mississippi: Global Truck & Equip. Co.,
Inc. v. Palmer Mach. Works, Inc., 628 F. Supp. 641, 652 (N.D. Miss. 1986) (“Given the
express language used in U.C.C. section 2-313 and the majority of the cases holding that
the buyer must both be knowledgeable of and rely on the affirmation of fact before an
express warranty is created, the court concludes that the plaintiff failed to prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that the statements contained in the Palmer brochure were
relied upon by Randall prior to or contemporaneously with the making of the contract
between Global and Palmer. Therefore, recovery under the theory of breach of express
warranty is also precluded.”); Washington: Casper v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,
806 F. Supp. 903, 909 (E.D. Wash. 1992) (citation omitted) (“If, in fact, Mr. Warr assured
Brad Casper that Velpar could be applied safely during November or December of 1990,
and Mr. Casper relied upon that affirmation of fact in deciding to have PureGro treat his
fields, an express warranty was created.”).
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“Unless excluded or modified, a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is
[automatically] implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect
to goods of that kind.” 224 “Merchantable” means the goods “are fit for the ordinary
purposes for which [they] are used.” 225 The U.C.C. defines a merchant as:
A person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices or
goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill may be
attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who
by his occupation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill. 226
Most embryo suppliers are merchants, for purposes of the U.C.C., pursuant to the
“deals in” definition, and quite probably under “knowledge and skill” as well. Most
embryo donors probably are not merchants under “knowledge and skill,” 227 but might be
under the “deals in” standard. 228
Embryo donors and suppliers have little to fear when it comes to the issue of breach of
warranty of merchantability because this warranty only requires that embryos be
“reasonably fit” for their ordinary use (attempted conception). The warranty does not
guarantee a resulting child, much less one with specific characteristics. Absent extreme
circumstances 229 it is unlikely that donors or suppliers would breach this warranty. 230
224

U.C.C. § 2-104(1).

225

Id. at § 2-314(2)(c).

226

Id. at § 2-104(1).

227

For an analogy, see Jayanti supra note 213, at 433 (“[T]he egg [donor] is usually less knowledgeable
than the ‘consumer’, the recipient parents.”)
228
One author flatly contends that human tissue donors are “…not often ‘engaged in the business’ of
selling or otherwise distributing [tissue]” and cannot be merchants under the U.C.C.. See Id. at 432.
However, the question of whether a party is a merchant for purposes of the U.C.C. is a question of law. See,
e.g., County of Milwaukee v. Northrop Data Systems. Inc., 602 F.2d 767 (7th Cir.1979). As such
determination must be made on a case by case basis, we cannot say that all embryo donors are merchants
and subject to the U.C.C.. Certainly some may be and it is likely that most, if not all, egg suppliers are
merchants for purposes of the U.C.C. as well.
229

Obvious examples are providing embryos damaged during collection, storage, or transportation such
that they cannot be gestated.
230

While rare, embryo donors and suppliers are protected by statute in some jurisdictions from this cause of
action and the one discussed next. As an example, South Carolina has a statute that states “The implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness shall not be applicable to a contract for the sale, procurement,
processing, distribution, or use of human tissues . . . .” See S.C. Code Ann. § 44-43-10 (2005). As

Outsourcing Reproduction:
Embryos & Surrogacy Services in the Cyberprocreation Era

38

c. FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
An implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose exists “where the seller at the
time of contracting has reason to know any particular purpose for which the goods are
required and that the buyer is relying on the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish
suitable goods.” 231 Responsible embryo donors and suppliers presently have little to fear
from this warranty because embryos satisfy only the general purpose of attempted
procreation, not any promise of characteristics in a resulting child. ART has not yet
advanced to the point where we can control specific aspects of reproduction. 232 However
ART is evolving rapidly and, if the time comes when we can control those types of
characteristics, then donors and suppliers must be aware that asking prospective
recipients to designate a donor’s personal characteristics can create a warranty of fitness
for a particular purpose. A prospective client could view such questions as a “checklist”
for the desired characteristics of the resulting child. They could then view such items as
akin to a menu and they would expect to get what they ordered. Human tissue suppliers
currently ask recipients for certain designations but, for now, they remain attempts to
discern preferences, not actionable promises. 233
2. STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY

previously discussed, the FDA classifies human embryos as reproductive tissue. See supra text
accompanying note 115.
231

U.C.C. § 2-315.

232

As examples, it cannot yet control characteristics such as height, eye color, intelligence, or athleticism.

233

This is a different conclusion than reached under breach of express warranty because it is a different
cause of action. The seller creates an express warranty, but a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is
actually created by the buyer, when he or she causes a seller to know that the buyer is relying on the seller’s
expertise in making a purchase decision. See text accompanying note 231. Admittedly it is an assumption,
but we assume that an embryo donor or supplier (seller) who is aware that a would-be donee (buyer) is
relying on their expertise, would inform the would-be donee that there is no guarantee that a child will have
the characteristics of the donor. We also understand that a donor or supplier may know of a donee’s
particular purpose (donee said that she wants an embryo that used eggs from a 5’4”, 115 lb., brown-haired,
blue-eyed world class cyclist because donee wants a child that will grow up to be a 5’4”, 115 lb., brownhaired, blue-eyed world class cyclist) but might not inform the donee that a child conceived using eggs
from this donor may not have these characteristics. In that case there is a breach of warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose.
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The rational for the tort of strict product liability is simple; products can cause harm or
injury to users and manufacturers, sellers, and distributors should absorb the cost of these
injuries rather than end-users. 234 Strict product liability has specific elements that an
injured party must satisfy to recover. While these elements are addressed collectively and
separately, all discussions encompass the following:
1. There must be a product 235 that causes an injury. The product must be sold in the
same condition, or substantially the same condition, as when reaching the
consumer or user. 236

2. The product must contain a defect and the defective condition must make the
product “unreasonably dangerous.” 237 “Unreasonably dangerous” is “…dangerous
to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer
who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to
its characteristics.” 238 There are three potential types of defects: manufacturing,
design, and warning. 239

234

See Seldon J. Childers, Don’t Stop the Music: No Strict Products Liability for Embedded Software, 19
U. Fla. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 125, 134 (2008):
The rationales for imposing strict liability for commercial products take two forms.
The first is a set of moral arguments, based on fairness, positing that manufacturers
are ethically responsible to innocent consumers who have been harmed because
the consumers had a reasonable expectation that the manufacturer would supply a
safe product. The second group of rationales is based on economic arguments or efficiency. For
example, it is argued that manufacturers are best able to insure
against losses and to spread the cost of such insurance among all the consumers
who purchase their products, and that strict liability creates socially desirable
economic incentives for manufacturers to produce safer products.
235

Courts define “product” very broadly. See MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCT LIABILITY
7.03[1] (4th ed. 1990).

236

See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).

237

Id. at § 402A(1) (“One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property….”)
238

239

Id. at § 402((A), cmt. i.

See generally William Powers, Jr., A Modest Proposal to Abandon Strict Products Liability, 1991 U. Ill.
L. Rev. 639 (1991).
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3. Finally, the plaintiff must prove actual injury caused by the product. An injury is
actual harm or loss to the party’s person, land, or chattel. 240
There is no question that reproductive tissue can cause damage to a recipient, resulting
fetus, or resulting child, 241 but this does not automatically mean that strict product
liability is a viable cause of action in such situations. In order to assess potential liability
under this doctrine we must determine if the requisite elements can be satisfied. While no
case has decided this issue, one can provide a partial template for analysis.
American Economy Insurance v. Schoolcraft 242 contained a variety of strict product
liability derivative claims 243 In that case one of the plaintiffs was implanted with embryos
that carried the cystic fibrosis gene. She gave birth to fraternal twins. The daughter was
quickly diagnosed with the disease. 244 American Economy did not address the merits of
any of its strict product liability causes of action, so we begin by addressing a question it
did not: are embryos “products?”
A product is defined as “something produced by human or mechanical effort or by a
natural process. 245 It is also a “commodit[y] for sale.” 246 Embryos are created by a natural
process in the female body and can be sold to prospective parents. Embryos are products.
The second element is that the embryo had a defect that made it unreasonably
dangerous. A product is defective when it is dangerous beyond the expectations of an

240

See FRUMER AND FRIEDMAN, 1-8 PRODUCTS LIABILITY 8.01[4] (2004).

241

See, e.g., Laurence Mascola & Mary E. Guinan, Screening to Reduce Transmission of Sexually
Transmitted Diseases in Semen Used for Artificial Insemination, 314 New Eng. J. Med. 1354, 1354 (1986)
(“[S]exually transmitted organisms have been transmitted during artificial insemination by donor, and such
transmission can cause . . . disease in the recipient woman and may harm the fetus or newborn.”)
242

551 F.Supp. 2d 1235 (D. Colo. 2007).

243

Id. at 1237.

244

Id.

245

See http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/product (last visited Jan. 16, 2011).

246

See Wordnet Search, http://wordnetweb.princeton.edu/perl/webwn (last visited Jan. 30, 2011) (search
“product”).
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ordinary user. 247 If an ordinary user would not expect an embryo to carry a strong
predisposition toward a specific disease, in this case cystic fibrosis, the embryo is
defective.
Finally, there must be an actual injury or loss to person or property caused by the
defective embryo. At a minimum, a child who is born with cystic fibrosis has
experienced, and will experience, several legally recognized and compensable injuries:
she has been damaged in her enjoyment of life, suffered and will suffer physical and
mental pain, endured past medical expenses, and is very likely to incur future medical
expenses. The end result of this analysis is that human embryos can be products that have
defects resulting in injury and triggering strict product liability. Embryo donors and
suppliers have significant reason to fear this cause of action. 248
3. NEGLIGENCE
Claimants have alleged negligence in holding facilities’ methods storage and
dissemination of human reproductive materials. These suits involved two different
contentions. In the first, the claimant wanted reproductive materials stored and distributed
to a specified recipient, but the facility failed. 249 For purposes of this article, we term
these “lost embryo” cases because, even if the embryo was used for conception, it did not
reach the intended recipient. In the second, a child was born with a birth defect
attributable to an embryo that should have been removed through adequate screening or
testing. We term these “defective embryo” cases.
a. LOST MATERIALS AND WRONGFUL BIRTH
247

See supra text accompanying notes 236-37.

248

One author would likely disagree with this conclusion and presents a number of possible defenses. See
Jayanti, supra note 213, at 432-35. She appears to be alone in this contention and, as previously discussed,
we find her logic repeatedly flawed. See J. Brad Reich and Dawn R. Swink, You Can’t Put the Genie Back
in the Bottle: Potential Rights and Obligations of Egg Donors in the Cyberprocreation Era, 20 Alb. L.J.
Sci. & Tech. 1, 302-315 (2010).
249

See, e.g., Stanton v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sciences Ctr., 997 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App. 1998); Harnicher v.
Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 68 (Utah 1998); see also Dorinda Elliot & Friso Endt, Twins – with
Two Fathers: A Fertility Clinic's Startling Error, NEWSWEEK, July 3, 1995, at 38; Barbara Kantrowitz &
David Kaplan, Not the Right Father, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 19, 1990, at 50; Michael Lasalandra, Woman, Ex
and Hospital Settle over Sperm Mixup, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 27, 1998, at 12.
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There are a number of reported embryos cases. 250 According to one source, such
accidents are exceedingly rare, 251 but perhaps not as rare as he espouses. In fact, they
might happen with disturbing regularity. 252 We contend that lost materials cases will
become even more common as people increasingly utilize forms of ART, but are
claimants likely to recover under a negligence theory? We must review the traditional
elements of that cause of action: duty, breach, proximate causation, and harm 253 to
determine potential liability.
It is easy to envision victims in lost embryo situations suing both the medical
professionals involved and the storage entity (such as a fertility clinic), however there is
one initial, and critical, difference. While medical professionals’ duties are well
established, 254 the legal duty of storage entities is not. 255 This uncertainty is the direct
250

See, e.g., Fertility Clinic to Couple: You Got the Wrong Embryos, WIBW NEWS, Sept. 23, 2009,
available at
http://www.wibw.com/home/headlines/60765137.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2010);
Quincy Couple Sue Boston Hospital Over Destroyed Embryos, WICKED LOCAL QUINCY NEWS, May 21,
2009, available at http://www.wickedlocal.com/quincy/news/police_and_fire/x1125039411/Quincycouple-sue-Boston-hospital-over-destroyed-embryos) (last visited Dec. 30, 2010); Creed v. United Hosp.,
600 N.Y.S.2d 151 (App. Div. 1993); Perry-Rogers v. Obasaju, 282 A.2d 231 (N.Y. App. 2001); Robert B.
and Denise B. v. Susan B., 2003 Cal. App. LEXIS 873. See also Jeter v. Mayo Clinic Arizona, 121 P.3d
1256, 1260 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005) (the central claim of the case was negligent destruction or loss of preimplantation embryos, the claimants were very concerned that the missing embryos may have been
mistakenly implanted in another woman).
251

See Fertility Clinic to Couple: You Got the Wrong Embryos, id. “Cases like these, while tragic, are
exceedingly rare, said Dr. David Adamson, a reproductive endocrinologist and past president of the
American Society for Reproductive Medicine (ASRM).” “There are well in excess of 100,000 embryo
transfers every year in this country,’ said Adamson, ‘The fact that this happens once in several hundred
thousand embryo transfers means the majority of the time, systems do protect this from taking place.’” Id.
This is suspect because the “systems” the Doctor appears to refer to are ASRM protocol recommendations
such as labeling embryos with the patient’s name and/or social security number or otherwise specifically
identifying ownership. Id. However, these are recommendations only and, as previously discussed (see
supra text accompanying notes167-71), there is no mandated quality control.

252

A representative of the United Kingdom IVF clinics estimates that one in one thousand IVF embryos are
implanted into the wrong woman. See Lois Rogers, Women Given Wrong Embryos at IVF Clinics, SUNDAY
TIMES (LONDON), Nov. 12, 2000, at 4. For a comprehensive history of ART “mix-up” cases and events, see
Leslie Bender, “To Err is Human” ART Mix-ups: A Labor-Based, Relationship Proposal, 9 J. Gender Race
& Just. 443, 446–53 (2006).
253

254

See Grubbs v. Barbourville Family Health Center, 2003 Ky, LEXIS 178 at 11-12.

For example, in New York, a physician has a duty to use reasonable care and exercise the degree of skill
and knowledge that is ordinarily possessed by physicians in the community. See Pepe v. United States, 599
F. Supp. 798, 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Pike v. Honsinger, 49 N.E. 760, 762 (N.Y. 1898); and Zellar v.
Tompkins Community Hosp., 508 N.Y.S.2d 84, 86 (App. Div. 1986).
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result of a lack of laws governing the embryo industry. As previously discussed there is
little federal regulation addressing embryo donor storage 256 and we are not aware of any
at the state level. Statutes can create legal duties, but statutory regulation is almost nonexistent, so we cannot say there is any truly established duty. Without a clearly defined
duty, it is very difficult to prove a resulting breach.
Unlike duty and breach, proximate cause in lost embryo cases is easily established.
When embryos did not reach the intended recipient, and additional materials are not
available from that donor, the contention is that but for defendant’s failure to provide the
appropriate embryos to the appropriate recipient, conception from that particular donor
would have been possible. In the case where embryos were provided to the wrong
recipient, and conception resulted, the contention is that but for the defendant’s failure to
provide the embryos to the intended recipient, the resulting child would not exist.
Harm is highly problematic in lost embryo cases because a court must determine
whether a) a party has suffered actual damage and, if so b) how to calculate such damage.
As discussed under causation, lost embryo damages could arise in two different
scenarios. The first is where the opportunity to procreate using a specific donor is simply
gone because embryos were lost and the donor cannot produce more. There are two
cases on point here. In Doe v. Irvine Scientific Sales Co. stored embryos were
contaminated and rendered unusable. 257 In Frisina v. Women and Infants Hosp. of R.I,
the hospital lost or destroyed stored embryos. 258 The court denied recovery in Doe
because the donors could not establish the requisite physical injury, 259 but the Frisina
court allowed recovery based on emotional distress absent physical trauma. 260 While this
is, admittedly, a very small sample of cases, it appears that the majority of jurisdictions
255

But see Jaynti, supra note 213, at 441 (arguing that a duty could be recognized under a “risk imports
relation” theory). There are no cases of record finding such a duty.

256

See supra text accompanying notes117-20.

257

7 F. Supp. 2d 737 (E.D. Va. 1998).

258

2002 WL 1288784 (R.I. Super. 2002).

259

7 F. Supp. 2d at 741.

260

2002 WL 1288784 at 10.
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would follow the Doe rationale because most jurisdictions deny recovery absent physical
injury. 261 Assuming this is correct, it is unlikely that defendants will be found liable
when stored embryos are lost.
In the second lost embryo scenario a recipient received, and utilized, materials from
someone other than the anticipated donor, resulting in the birth of a healthy baby. At
least one author has been highly critical of the basis for damages under such
circumstances. 262 And, while the suit did not assert a negligence cause of action, at least
one court held that a couple whose healthy child was conceived using lost embryos was
not entitled to recovery. 263 This decision is not surprising when this lost embryo claim is
juxtaposed with the “wrongful birth” cause of action.
Wrongful birth actions are brought by the parents of an impaired child for the
emotional and financial damages they suffer from the birth of that child. 264 At least one
author contends that wrongful birth cases have some judicial support and acceptance. 265
261

See generally Ingrid H. Heide, Negligence in the Creation of Healthy Babies: Negligent Infliction of
Emotional Distress in Cases of Alternative Reproductive Technology Malpractice without Physical Injury,
9 J. Med. & L. 55 (2005). However, a claimant may recover for loss of property in such claims and
physical injury would not be required. See Jeter, supra note 250, at 1273) (“While a party cannot bring a
claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress based merely on the negligent destruction of property, a
party can recover damages for emotional distress arising from the tortious loss of property if the emotional
distress is unrelated to the pecuniary loss.”); Frisina, 2002 WL 1288784, at 37 (“[T]he Court finds…that
recovery for damages for emotional distress based on the “loss of irreplaceable property’, the loss of their
pre-embryos, is permissible….”) Id.

262

See generally Raizel Liebler, Are You My Parent? Are You My Child? The Role of Genetics and Race in
Defining Relationships after Reproductive Technological Mistakes, 5 DePaul J. Health Care L. 15 (2002).
263

See Chris Snow, Note, Harnicher v. University of Utah Medical Center: Fertility Treatment and the
Duty of Care, 2 J. L. Fam. Stud. 63 (2000) (addressing the tort of “negligent infliction of emotional harm”
and denying recovery as plaintiffs could not prove the requisite element of resulting “bodily harm” as part
of their injury and damage). But see Chambliss v. Health Sci. Found., 626 S.E.2d 791 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006) (A North Carolina jury awarded $85,000 in compensatory damages and $350,000 in punitive
damages to a woman who was inseminated with lost materials, although the cause of action and the jury
finding regarding bodily injury are unclear in the appellate opinion.).
264

See Timothy J. Dawe, Note, Wrongful Life: Time for a “Day in Court”, 51 Ohio St. L.J. 473, 476
(1990).
265

See Megan D. McIntyre, The Potential for Products Liability Actions When Artificial Insemination by
an Anonymous Donor Produces Children with Genetic Defects, 98 Dick. L. Rev. 519, 539-40 (1993):
The child's mother would have a better chance of recovering if she brings a
products liability claim in her own right, seeking damages based on a wrongful
birth theory. The wrongful birth claim enjoys far greater judicial acceptance
than wrongful life because it does not define the wrong as the child being given
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If true, this could increase the likelihood that damages are awarded in lost embryo cases
because, at base, both wrongful birth and lost materials actions seek damages for birth of
a child. However there are two significant differences in the claims that make it unlikely
that such damages would be awarded in lost embryo cases. First, in a wrongful birth
claim the child is impaired, 266 in a lost embryo case the child is not. Second, the
assertion that wrongful birth is judicially acceptable is true, but far from universal. 267
There are few recorded wrongful birth decisions, 268 and none since the 1980s. 269 Some
state courts refuse to recognize wrongful birth causes of action absent statutory
creation. 270 Some state legislatures have passed laws refusing to recognize wrongful
birth causes of action. 271 Only one state, Maine, statutorily recognizes wrongful birth,
and then only for a limited cause of action. 272 Even where wrongful birth exists, a highly
pragmatic consideration exists when it comes to assessing damage because “[j]uries

life, but rather as the denial of the mother's right to choose to abort or to never even
initiate the pregnancy. Thus, if the mother can show that she would not have
carried the child to term or that she would not have consented to the
insemination if she had known the truth about the sperm donor's medical history,
many courts may award her compensation for wrongful birth.
266

Wrongful Birth damages are predicated on the existence of a congenital defect. See, e.g., Hall v.
Dartmouth Hitchcock Med. Ctr., 899 A.2d 249, 245 (N.H. 2006).
267

As of 2005, more than half of all United States jurisdictions recognized Wrongful Birth. See Wendy F.
Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev.
141, 160 (2005).
268

See, e.g., Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979); Becker v. Schwartz/Park v. Chessin, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 386 N.E.2d 807 (1978); Jacobs v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846 (Tex. 1975);
Dumer v. St. Michael's Hospital, 69 Wis.2d 766, 233 N.W.2d 372 (1975); and Moores v. Lucas, 405 So.2d
1022 (1981); Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 698 P.2d 315, 319, 322 (Idaho 1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran
Gen. Hosp., 1987 Ill. LEXIS 208.
269

The most recent decision we are aware of is Gallagher v. Duke University, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS
10022.
270

See, e.g., Etkind v. Suarez, 519 S.E.2d 210 (Ga. 1999); Campbell v. United States, 1992 U.S. App.
LEXIS 13381.
271

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 145.424(2) (1997).

272

See ME. REV. STATE. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (West 1997).
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would have an extremely difficult time trying to calculate how much the life of a disabled
child is worth.” 273
If it is difficult for a jury to calculate damages to parents based on birth of a
disabled child, it is even more difficult to calculate damages to parents for the birth of a
healthy child. Finally, this type of claim seeks damages for birth and subsequent child
rearing expenses. Such damages are seldom awarded. 274 Claimants likely cannot succeed
in lost materials cases because, regardless of which scenario their claim falls under, they
cannot satisfy the requisite elements. 275
b. DEFECTIVE EMBRYOS AND WRONGFUL LIFE
Defective reproductive materials can cause children born with defects. The
questions addressed in this subsection are whether the parents, and/or the child, can
recover damages for such an existence.
i. TRADITIONAL NEGLIGENCE
The elements of duty and breach raise the same concerns previously discussed; 276
because specific legal duties are largely uncertain, resulting breach is difficult to prove.
273

See Monique Ann-Marie Croon, Note, Taylor v. Kurapati: The Court of Appeals of Michigan’s Decision
of Refusing to Recognize the Tort of Wrongful Birth, 5 DePaul J. Health Care L. 317, 339 (2002). But see
Grubbs, supra note 253 at 21 (“[S]uccessful plaintiffs in wrongful birth actions have received various types
of damages ranging from the expenses resulting from the impairment but not the normal costs of raising the
child, to the entire cost of raising the child with no reduction for the cost of raising a healthy child, to only
the parents' own suffering and mental anguish resulting from the child's birth but not the expense of raising
the child.”) That case did not cite other decisions in support of this contention. See also Siemienic, supra
note 268 at 50-51 (asserting that the majority of jurisdictions limit recovery to “extraordinary expenses” –
or those costs which are necessary to treat the disorder).
274

See, e.g., Johnson v. Univ. Hosp., 540 N.E.2d 1370, 1376 (Ohio 1989) (“Another rationale is that the
cost of child-rearing would be too speculative to measure with any certainty.”).
275

There is a third possible scenario under this subsection and it combines the two lost materials scenarios
discussed. Material could be lost and delivered to an incorrect recipient, who then uses it to conceive a
child who is impaired. We could not find any record of this occurring, and we have no sense of how
common this scenario might be, but we have to assume it could happen. If it did occur, it would suffer the
same fate as the other lost materials scenarios and for many of the same reason. First, any legal duty is
uncertain. Second, that uncertainty makes proving breach difficult or impossible. Third, proximate
causation may be extremely difficult to establish because birth defects may be caused by many sources.
Finally, it is extremely difficult for juries to value the harm created by the birth of an impaired child.
276

But see Lars Noah, Assisted Reproductive Technologies and the Pitfalls of Unregulated Biomedical
Innovation, 55 Fla. L. Rev. 603, 638-39 (2003) (“…courts may well conclude that fertility doctors and
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Perhaps more significantly, proximate causation is problematic. Pursuant to that element,
a claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, there is a direct causal link
between the materials provided and the resulting condition. Such a tie is extremely
difficult to establish because “the majority of genetic and nongenetic birth defects occur
as the result of spontaneous mutations such that causation cannot be attributed to either
biological parent.” 277 If the claimant can establish causation, damages for harm should be
much more readily available than in a lost materials case and should encompass
“economic damages of raising [a] disabled child over and above the ordinary childbearing expenses.” 278 Additionally, depending on the conduct of the defendant,
compensatory damages could provide the basis for punitive damages in defective
materials cases. 279 However, much like lost embryo cases, claimants asserting this cause
of action are unlikely to succeed due to their inability to satisfy the elements. It does not
appear that embryo donors or suppliers currently have much to fear from this claim. 280
c. WRONGFUL LIFE CLAIMS
Wrongful Life is a specific claim under the general umbrella of negligence. It is made
by, or on behalf of, an impaired child asserting that the he or she would have been spared

clinics have a duty of care running to the class of intended offspring.”) This is a potentially significant
development, and a discussion that could shape much regarding this cause of action, but the author does not
propose what that duty is or should be and none of the cases the he cites in support of this contention
involve lost materials.
277

See supra note 265, at 537.

278

Schirmer v. Mt. Aubrun Obstetrics & Gynecological Ass’n., 2003 Ohio App. LEXIS 6471 at 1.

279

See, e.g., Paretta v. Medical Offices for Human Reproduction., 2003 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 321 at 20.
However, punitive damage recovery may not be possible is some jurisdictions, especially if embryo
suppliers are treated as some sperm banks have been. See Kenneth Ofgang, Sperm Bank Protected as
“Health Care Provider,” Court Rules, METROPOLITAN NEWS CO., Sept. 3, 2002, at 1 (“A sperm bank is a
‘health care provider,’ entitled to special statutory protection from punitive damage claims.”).
280

It is also possible that the holding facility could assert a “state of the art” defense, admitting it had a duty
to act reasonably and did so, but alleging that medical technology existing at the time of the donation and
transfer was not sufficient to reveal any pre-existing defect in the reproductive material. See McIntyre,
supra note 277, at 544. (“The state-of-the-art defense is properly invoked only if there was no
technologically feasible way of discovering the defect in the [material]. In these particular cases, the stateof-the-art defense acts as an absolute bar to negligence.”) Id. The viability of this defense then depends on
the type of defect and the technology available at the time of donation and transfer.
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impaired existence, either through parental choice not to conceive or through an abortion,
were it not for the negligence of a defendant. 281
Wrongful life has the same elements previously discussed under negligence; duty
breach, proximate causation and harm. The first three elements continue to suffer the
same deficiencies. The legal duties are uncertain, 282 making breach difficult to prove, 283
and proximate causation remains difficult to establish. Only three states currently
recognize a cause of action for wrongful life 284 and several refused to do so, either by
statute 285 or common law. 286 This lack of acceptance is, at least partially, a product of the
courts’ inability to address the legal issue of harm, separate from a moral or societal
issue:
In wrongful life claims…the child usually asserts as “general” damages the
pain and suffering he will endure during his lifetime as a result of the defect,
but presumably less the benefits he will derive from his existence, if any.
This “net burden” is then measured not against the value of a “normal” life,
but against the nullity of nonexistence. 287
281

See Dawe, supra note 264, at 475.

282

But see Huddleston v. Infertility Ctr. of Am., Inc., 700 A.2d 453, 460 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (holding that
a surrogacy business had a special relationship with the parties and, therefore, owed a duty to protect the
resulting child from foreseeable risks).
283

But see supra note 264, at 477 (asserting that “With few exceptions modern courts have had little
trouble accepting the elements of duty and breach in wrongful life cases.”) However, the author cites only
one case, Albala v. City of New York, 54 N.Y.2d, 269, 429 N.E.2d 786, 445 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1981) in
support of this contention.
284

See Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 966 (Cal. 1982); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 656 P.2d 483, 497
(Wash. 1983); Procanik ex rel. Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 765 (N.J. 1984), rev'd, 543 A.2d 985 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988).
285

See, e.g., IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-334(1) (2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-12-1-1 (LexisNexis 1998); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 600.2971(2) (West Supp. 2007), following Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 308 N.W.2d 209,
212-13 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981), abrogated by Taylor v. Kurapati, 600 N.W.2d 670 (Mich. 1999); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145.424(1) (West 2005); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.130(1) (West 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 3203-43 (1996); 42 PA. CONN. STAT. ANN. § 8305(b) (West 2007), following Ellis v. Sherman, 515 A.2d
1327, 1329-30 (Pa. 1986); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-55-1 (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (2002);
286

See Ronen Perry, It’s a Wonderful Life, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 329, 336-37 (2008) (listing more than 20
states where courts rejected such claims). See also Doolan v. IVF Am. (MA), Inc., 2000 Mass. Super.
LEXIS 581, at 8-12 (rejecting a tort claim brought on behalf of a child born with cystic fibrosis against a
fertility clinic for negligence in genetic screening of IVF embryos before implantation because it amounted
to a claim for Wrongful Life not recognized in Massachusetts).
287

See supra note 65, at 479-80.
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The response has been that:
Courts have consistently refused to recognize claims for wrongful life because
of the deep-seated ethical dilemma involved. 288 Few courts have been willing to
say that children, no matter how severely impaired, would have better off had
they never been born. “One of the most deeply held beliefs in our society is that
life—whether experienced with or without major physical handicap—is more
precious than non-life.” 289
Courts have held “…that life itself cannot constitute injury.” 290 As a result the harm
element cannot be satisfied when there is a birth, even the birth of an impaired child. In
the unlikely event that a wrongful life cause of action is recognized, a claimant will find
it very difficult to establish any of the first three elements, and the fourth may be
judicially impossible for the parent(s) 291 or the child. 292
4. EMBRYO DISPOSAL – THE LIABILITY MYSTERY
We discussed specific causes of action that may make embryo donors or suppliers
liable above, but we would be remiss if we did not also address potential liability for

288

See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411-12 (1978) (“[W]hether it is better never to have been
born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the
philosophers and the theologian.”)
289

See supra note 277, at 539 (citing Berman v. Allan, 404 A.2d 8, 12 (N.J. 1979).

290

See Deanna A. Pollard, Wrongful Analysis and Wrongful Life Jurisprudence, 55 Ala. L. Rev. 327, 328
(2004).

291

See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 1967 N.J. LEXIS 203 at 11-12:
A considerable problem is raised by the claim of injury to the parents. In order to
determine their compensatory damages a court would have to evaluate the denial to
them of the intangible, unmeasurable, and complex human benefits of motherhood
and fatherhood and weigh these against the alleged emotional and money injuries.
Such a proposed weighing is similar to that which we have found impossible to
perform for the infant plaintiff. When the parents say their child should not have been
born, they make it impossible for a court to measure their damages in being the
mother and father of a defective child. Though we sympathize with the unfortunate
situation in which these parents find themselves, we firmly believe the right of their
child to live is greater than and precludes their right not to endure emotional and
financial injury. Id. at 14.

292

Id. at 10 (“The infant would have us measure the difference between his life with defects against the
utter void of nonexistence, but it is impossible to make such determination.”)
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embryo storage facilities intentionally destroying embryos. The challenge is that we
cannot identify one primary cause of action likely at issue because liability would depend
on the legal status of embryos. What we do believe is that there are more than 500,000
embryos currently in cryopreservation. 293 Those embryos belong 294 to the prospective
parents, at least until certain contractual events do or do not occur 295 and many of those
prospective parents eventually place the holding facility in a position where it has the
legal right to dispose of the embryos. 296 While many of these facilities would like to do
so, 297 they are very afraid of litigation. 298 They might gain guidance from a very small

293

See supra text accompanying note 60.

294

But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (West 2006).

295

See Fontini Antonia Skouvakis, Defining the Undefined: Using a Best Interests Approach to Decide the
Fate of Cryopreserved Preembryos in Pennsylvania, 109, Penn. St. L. Rev. 885, 902 (2005) (The author
spoke to twenty infertility clinics posing as a potential customer. All stated they utilized “informed
consent” forms identifying how pre-embryos would be disposed of.) But see Mundy, supra note 39, at 7
(doctors, while commonly contractually empowered to dispose of embryos in events such as patient
divorce, disappearance, or failure to make payment, do not dispose out of fear of unknown litigation).
Interestingly such agreements may restrict the recipients disposition options as well. See Id. See also the
hypothetical scenario discussed at Jonathan Penn, A Different Kind of Life Estate: The Laws, Rights, and
Liabilities Associated with Donated Embryos, 21 Regent U.L. Rev. 207, 208 (2008-2009) (it involves a
contract specifying that “…nothwithstanding the foregoing, the Intended Parents…shall not donate, see, or
otherwise transfer any donated ova, pre-embryos, or embryos that result from the Procedure to another
person or couple (other than a gestational surrogate working with the Intended Parents) for the purpose of
conception.”)
296

See Mundy, supra note 39, at 7 (“The way it happens is this: When patients agree to have embryos
frozen, they sign forms stating what should be done with the embryos should the patients divorce,
disappear, or stop paying storage fees. After treatment has concluded, many patients eventually do stop
paying, disappear, move [and] leave no forwarding address.”) Many embryo owners cannot be located,
period. Id. at 4.

297

Id. at 7. “People do not want to inherit embryos.”
And the risk of holding them is considerable. “I have tons of embryos, and I can’t track
down the owners,” said one Los Angeles doctor, Vicken Sahakian of the Pacific Fertility
Center…”It’s one of the main problems I have. I have thousands of embryos from patients
who have been through this program for, what, 10-, 12-plus years, changing addresses,
and never called back, never paid storage fees—you can’t track them down.” Id. at 8.
His “biggest nightmare,” he said, is that he will be unable to sell his practice when he is
ready to retire, because no doctor will want to buy a practice that comes with a closetful
of unclaimed embryos and the vague, terrible responsibility they entail. “The person
buying it does not want to buy the embryos. That’s the rule,” he said. “People do not
want to inherit embryos. So what do you do with them? I have embryos that have been
here since 1992.” Id.
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pool of decisions holding that embryo disposition is usually dictated by contract. 299
However, not all courts hold such agreements enforceable and almost all of the existing
cases arose out of disputes that addressed some aspect of potentially unwanted familial
relationships. 300 Only one case is possibly on point in terms of the independent
disposition by a holding facility with no inter-related “custody” issues, New York-Del Zio
v. Presbyterian Hospital. 301
In New York-Del Zio, the Del Zios underwent in vitro fertilization using Mr. Del Zio’s
sperm and Mrs. Del Zio’s egg. 302 The co-mingled materials were placed in an
incubator. 303 A supervisor learned of the embryo, felt it was his ethical duty to destroy it,
consulted hospital officials, and did destroy it. 304 The Del Zios brought suit for
intentional infliction of emotional distress and wrongful conversion. 305 The jury returned
a verdict for the Del Zios on the intentional infliction claim, but for the hospital on the
wrongful conversion cause of action. 306 We glean two things from New York-Del Zio.
First, a holding facility disposing of an embryo, without contractual right, can be liable to
the prospective parents in tort. Second, if the embryo is viewed as other than property,
the facility is not liable under wrongful conversion, as conversion is predicated on
wrongful possession of property. 307 This is extremely interesting because, if embryos are
298

See Mundy, supra n. 39, at 8 (“’Nobody does it [destroys abandoned embryos],’ says Alan DeCherney,
the editor of Ferility and Sterility and a reproductive endocrinologist who is now at the National Institute of
Health. ‘It’s a hot topic. People think the risk of holding them is less than the risk of destroying them.’”)

299

See, e.g., Kass v. Kass, 355 N.W.2d 335 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 216
(Wash. 2002); York v. Jones, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7750.
300

See, e.g., A.Z v. B.Z, 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); J.B. v. M.B, 751 A.2d 613 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2000); In re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2004).
301

1978 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11450.

302

Id. at 3.

303

Id.

304

Id.

305

Id. at 1.

306

Id. at 11.

307

See Penn, supra n. 295, at 213:
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not property, some disposal would open the door for wrongful death 308 claims, but one
court found that it unlikely a defendant could be held responsible for the wrongful death
of a human embryo because the claim would be too speculative, 309 while another found
that the state Wrongful Death Act was not applicable to situations where the embryo was
destroyed pre-implantation. 310 On the other hand, if embryos are property, it seems only
logical that facilities disposing of them, in violation of an existing contract, could face
liability from conversion 311 claims, and possibly other causes of action such as trespass to
chattels 312.
B. THE SURROGACY TRADE 313
Presumably, the jury in the Del Zio case found for the Del Zios on the emotional
Distress claim because they viewed the embryo as the only opportunity for the Del
Zios to become pregnant and hopefully give birth to a child. Viewing the embryo
as the potential for human life is also consistent with the jury's finding for the
defendants on the wrongful conversion claim, a claim where it must be proven that
“one who, without authority, intentionally exercised control over the property of
another and thereby interfered with the other's right of possession . . . .”
Presumably, the jury considered the embryo to be human life or the potential for
human life, rather than property. Therefore, the jury denied the Del Zios' property
claim of wrongful conversion.
308

For purposes of this article “wrongful death” is defined as “The taking of the life of an individual
resulting from the willful or negligent act of another person or persons.) See West’s ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN LAW, available at http://www.answers.com/topic/wrongful-death-claim (last visited Jan. 6,
2011).
309

See Jeter, supra note 250, 1256.

310

See Miller v. American Infertility Group, 897 N.E.2d 837 (2008). The case, in dicta, left open the issue
of applicability post-implantation.
311

While the specific elements of torts vary by jurisdiction, a common definition of “conversion” is “The
unlawful turning or applying the personal goods of another to the use of the taker, or of some other person
than the owner; or the unlawful destroying or altering their nature.” See
http://www.lectlaw.com/def/c309.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2011).
312

See Luize E. Zubrow, Rethinking Article 9 Remedies: Economic and Fiduciary Perspectives, 42 UCLA
L. Rev. 445, n. 307 (1994) (“The early common law distinguished between trespass to chattel, a lesser form
of conversion involving negligent interference with the property of others, and conversion, an intentional
exercise of dominion or control which seriously interferes with the right of another to control the property.
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 217 cmt. b, 222 cmt. a & 222(A) (1964).

313

While discussion of the employment relationship between surrogates and surrogate providers is beyond
the scope of this article, we do note that potential provider liability for surrogate actions or inaction could
differ depending on whether surrogates are employed as employees or independent contractors. See, e.g.,
Barbara A. Noah, The Managed Care Dilemma: Can Theories of Tort Liability Adapt to the Realities of
Cost Containment?, 48 Mercer L. Rev. 1219, 1237 (1997) (noting that the doctrine of respondeat superior
depends on existence of employer-employee, or closely analogous, relationship and generally does not
apply to acts of independent contractor).
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“In the absence of statutory law positively governing our decision,
we must innovate.” 314
1. NEGLIGENCE
The well-established elements of negligence are duty, breach, proximate
causation, and damage or injury. 315 As we discuss next, in a surrogacy arrangement the
surrogate providers, and the surrogate herself, may face negligence liability. The
surrogate provider may be liable for failing to screen materials used or the prospective
parties. The surrogate may be liable for care taken of the embryo while in her possession,
as the relationship between her and the prospective parent(s) may be a bailment.
a. SCREENING
Tissues potentially involved in surrogacy include sperm, eggs, and embryos.
While there are no cases on point regarding eggs and embryos, there is a sperm case that
may provide insight regarding potential surrogate provider liability. 316 Stiver v. Parker 317
addressed the situation where the surrogate (Stiver) was artificially inseminated with the
untested sperm of the prospective father (Malahoff). The resulting child suffered from
cytomegalic inclusion disease (“CID”), transmitted through his father’s sperm. The
child’s CID symptoms included hearing loss, mental retardation, and severe neuromuscular disorders. 318 The surrogate, and her husband, brought suit under a negligence
claim against the clinic. 319 The trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the

314

Stiver v. Parker, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21830, at 17.

315

See Grubbs, supra note 253.

316

The analogy is appropriate as sperm and embryos are both reproductive tissues. See supra note 114.

317

1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 21830.

318

Id. at 2. Interestingly, it was later learned that the surrogate was already pregnant when inseminated. The
father of the resulting child was, in fact, her husband and not the clinic’s client. Id.
319

Id. at 7.
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broker in a surrogacy arrangement had no legal duty. 320 The court of appeals reversed 321
holding:
We conclude that…the surrogacy business designer and broker and
other defendant professionals who profited from the program, owed
affirmative duties to the Stivers and to Malahoff, the surrogacy program
beneficiaries. This duty, an affirmative duty of protection, marked by
heightened diligence, arises out of a special relationship because the
defendants engaged in the surrogacy business and expected to profit
thereby. 322 Our view is that surrogate arrangements for the transfer of
babies present significant dangers for society and therefore require careful
regulation and control through the development of the common law of
negligence…[t]his strong state interest justifies regulation…in new areas
of “baby transfer” made possible by technology. 323
While Stiver was not mandatory authority, a later case adopted its “special
relationship” basis for establishing a legal duty in surrogacy arrangements. In Huddleston
v. Infertility Center of America 324 the child of a traditional surrogate died after suffering
serious abuse by his father. 325 The surrogate (Huddleston) brought a variety of claims,
including negligence, against the infertility clinic contracting her services. 326 The court
first distilled the issue; “Is there a duty owed by a surrogacy clinic to the participants of a
program which is specifically designed to create a child outside the boundaries of the
traditional nuclear family setting?” 327 It then concluded, much like Stiver, that:
[A] business operating for the sole purpose of organizing and supervising
the very delicate process of creating a child, which reaps handsome profits
from such endeavor, must be held accountable for the foreseeable risks of
the surrogacy undertaking because a “special relationship” exists between
320

Id. at 1.

321
Id. at 7 (“We conclude under Michigan law of negligence that the defendants owed an affirmative duty
to act to protect the plaintiffs against harm, a duty that may have been breached.”)
322

Id. at 20.

323

Id. at 22-23.

324

1997 Pa. Super. LEXIS 2650.

325

Id. at 4.

326

Id. at 1.

327

Id. at 9.
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the surrogacy business, its client-participants, and, most especially, the
child which the surrogacy undertaking creates. Such a special relationship
existed between ICA, Appellant and Jonathan in this case and thus, ICA
owed them an affirmative duty of protection. 328
That “protection” meant that the surrogate provider had the duty to screen prospective
parents. It is also clear from the court’s discussion that providers had the duty to screen
prospective surrogates as well. 329 The above cases identify duties that could be breached
and provide facts that could allow proximate causation determination. However the
damage element may again be difficult to meet in jurisdictions requiring physical
injury. 330 If embryos are “people”, there could be requisite physical injury. 331 If, on the
other hand, embryos are property, liability assessment may be assessed under the
traditional concept of “bailment.”
2. BAILMENT
A bailment is “the temporary placement of control over, or possession of personal
property by one person, the bailor, into the hands of another, the bailee, for a designated
purpose upon which the parties have agreed.” 332 There are three types of bailments: (1)
for mutual benefit to the bailor and bailee; (2) for the sole benefit of the bailor; and (3)
for the sole benefit of the bailee. 333 When embryos are property, surrogacy is legally a
mutual bailment. In a mutual bailment the bailee must take reasonable care of the bailed
property. 334 A bailee who fails to do so may be held liable for any damages incurred from
328

Id. at 17.

329

While the court did not reach a conclusion on that issue, it noted that other jurisdictions required parties
to prospective surrogacy agreements to undergo psychological testing. Id. at 19. See also Mercer, supra
note 22 at 80 (“Since there may be potential liability to clinics and agencies involved with embryo
transfer…it would be in the clinic or agency’s best interest to perform background checks on recipient
couples in order to reduce potential liability.”)
330

See supra text accompanying note 260.

331

Some jurisdictions also recognize prenatal torts without specifically finding that an unborn child is a
“person in being”. See, e.g., Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 364 (1960).
332

See http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/bailment (last visited Jan. 9, 2011).

333

Id.

334

Id.
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his or her negligence. 335 While the contention that surrogacy is a bailment will be
unconscionable to those against commodification of human reproductive tissue, 336 at
least one court has applied bailment law when deciding ownership rights of an embryo. 337
That court was correct. Bailment provides the proper liability analysis where embryos do
not have some sort of heightened legal status because, in those jurisdictions, embryos are
property.
3. BREACH OF CONTRACT
This potential cause of action may correlate with aspects of negligence assessment.
The first element of negligence is duty. The existence of that element is well established,
but its definition is always subjective as it is predicated upon the “reasonable person”
standard. 338 Clarification of a surrogate’s duties may come from a surrogacy contract. 339
Breach of any such duty would then not only satisfy the first two elements of negligence,
but also trigger breach of contract. Surrogates should face liability when failing to do
what that agreement requires, 340 while surrogate providers should face liability when

335

Id.

336

See supra note 211. One author believes this discussion is much less heated than in the past. See
Elizabeth Scott, Surrogacy and the Politics of Commodification, 72 J.L. & Con’t Problems 108, 121 (2009)
(“Today the issue is seldom framed as baby selling and exploitation; instead the discourse emphasizes the
service provided by surrogates to couples who otherwise could not have genetically related children.”)
However, it is difficult to imagine a dearth of heated opinions should a surrogate seek to exercise a “lien”
over a resulting child in order to enforce payment and it appears some surrogacy agreements anticipate just
such situation. See http://indiansurrogacylaw.com/surrogacy-agreement.html (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
While seeking to enforce such a lien would, undoubtedly, create an emotional fervor, the legal issue is
clearly addressed under the 13th Amendment to the United States Constitution. See U.S. Const. amend.
XIII, § 1. (“Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude . . . shall exist within the United States….”). No such
lien would be enforceable.
337

See York v. Jones, 717 F.Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).

338

See, e.g., Robert J. Rhee, A Principled Solution for Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claims, 36
Ariz. St. L.J. 805, 810 (2004) (“Duty in negligence actions is substantially defined by foreseeability of risk
as measured by the reasonably prudent person.”)
339

“Although affirmative duties in negligence law are imposed ‘by operation of law’, a contract frequently
operates in the background and the specific obligations ‘may and frequently do arise out of a contractual
relationship.’” See Stiver, supra note 314, at 12, citing Clark v. Dalman, 379 Mich. 251 (1967).
340

Agreements may require the to-be surrogate promise to refrain from activities such as smoking tobacco,
drinking alcohol, or taking other drugs. See Golmar Modjtahedi, Nobody’s Child: Enforcing Surrogacy
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failing to meet contractual duties to surrogates or prospective parents. 341 This cause of
action is viable, but determination of controlling law may be difficult 342 and breach of
contract may be impossible in jurisdiction invalidating any form of surrogacy agreement.
VII. LOOKING AHEAD

The increasingly symbiotic relationship between ART and the Internet fundamentally
changes how human procreation can be facilitated. Much is uncertain in the
Cyberprocreation Era, but issues regarding embryo donation and/or surrogacy will be
significant on many levels, and likely manifest quickly. Accordingly we offer the
following predictions and recommendations:
1. Prediction – a group, or groups, will call for an absolute ban on embryo donation
and/or commercial surrogacy worldwide.
Recommendation – it is unlikely that such restriction would be adopted globally
due to political volatility343 and economic necessity. 344 Such a ban would really
create fewer good and service providers, likely with even less regulation. 345 We
do not recommend this ban.

Contracts, 20 Whittier L. Rev. 243, 249 (1998). See also http://www.information-on-surrogacy.com/bestsurrogacy.html (last visited Jan. 5, 2010).
341

See supra text accompanying note 218.

342

See Baiman, supra note 112, at 135 (“[I]s the applicable state law the law of the home state of the
genetic parents, the law of the state in which the embryos were created, or the law of the state where the
recipient party lives?”) One could go further and add the law of the state where the embryos are currently
located and the law of the state where the contract was created to this list.

343

See supra n. 87, at 704-705 (discussing Italy’s extreme shift from one of the least ART regulated
countries to one that now prohibits egg donorship for ART.) “This problem will only be inflamed as
countries continue to change their laws, which are becoming increasingly divergent from one another.” Id.
at 707.
344

Market demands may sway countries to defy international agreements in pursuit of RT dollars. See Id. at
707-08. Additionally, clinics are sourcing reproductive materials from poorer countries. See Buying Babies,
Bit By Bit; Assisted Conception, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 23, 2006, available at
http://www.uslaw.com/bulletin/buying-babies-bit-by-bit.php?p=118) (last visited Jan. 17, 2011).
345

“As medical tourism becomes more lucrative, countries may compete by offering treatments that other
countries do not offer. Poor countries may be tempted to offer treatments that are illegal or highly
experimental elsewhere.” See Cortez, supra note 72, at 104.
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2. Prediction – there will be a call for the United States to ban embryo donation 346
and/or commercial surrogacy.
Recommendation – we cannot endorse this proposal, as it would likely result in
fewer providers with less regulation. We do recommend that Congress use its
interstate commerce power to regulate collection, storage, and screening of human
embryos. 347 While some authors favor “double decker” ART regulation, meaning
directives at both the federal and state levels, 348 we recommend any other embryo,
and all surrogacy regulation, only at the state level, 349 We do so for two reasons.
First, state courts decide family law issues. 350 Second, as detailed in the case
law 351 and demonstrated statutorily, 352 the states may have very different public

346

See, e.g., Ann Bindu Thomas, Avoiding EMBRYOS “R” US: Toward a Regulated Fertility Industry, 27
Wash. U. L.J. & Pol’y 247271 (2008) (the author advocates for three components of such regulation “(1)
embryos should not be bought or sold in a monetary exchange, (2) donors’ decisions should be fully
informed and truly voluntary, and (3) embryo procurement organizations should be non-profit and conform
to standards similar to [the National Organ Transplant Act].”)
347

But see Debra Spar, Reproductive Tourism and the Regulatory Map, 352 New Eng. J. Med. 531, 532
(2005) (“Americans, with their distrust of bureaucratic authority, would never condone the extension of
federal power into the intimate affairs of reproduction.”); Alicia Ouellette et al., Lessons From Across the
Pond: Assisted Reproductive Technology in the United Kingdom and the United States, 31 Am. J. L. and
Med. 419, 433 (2005) (arguing that federal regulation of ART is problematic). These perspectives may or
may not be prescient, but the sale of some body parts is already federally regulated. See 42 U.S.C. § 274(e)
(“It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise transfer any human organ
for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the transfer affects interstate commerce.”)
348

See Jennifer L. Rosato, The Children of ART (Assisted Reproductive Technology): Should the Law
Protect then from Harm?, 207 PLI/CRIM 325, 328 (2004); Wise, supra n. 29, at 188.
349
This would also be in accord with the most current version of the UPA. See supra note 102 at Comment
following §802, “[T]he core sections of this article provide for state involvement, through judicial
oversight, of the gestational agreement before, during, and after the assisted reproductive processes.”
350

See Helene S. Shapo, Assisted Reproduction and the Law: Disharmony on a Divisive Social Issue, 100
N.W. U.L. REV. 465, 466 (2006) (“[D]omestic relations law is generally reserved for the states.”) However,
the author goes on to recognize, with regard to ART issues, “…a fractured, state-by-state approach to the
subject has arisen.” Id. Another author would likely contend those differences are acceptable, and the key
is that parties considering surrogacy arrangements have clear statutory directive so that they can make
informed decisionn. See supra note 114, at 135 (“Without a clear statutory scope, parties and courts will
remain in the dark as to which state law applies in a dispute.”).
351

See, e.g., note 186

352

See supra text accompanying notes 132-154.
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policies regarding embryos and surrogacy. 353 We understand this
recommendation will create a lack of uniformity, 354 and that some will attempt to
exploit lax or nonexistent state laws, 355 but it appropriately respects the divergent
interests of the individual states.
3. Prediction – there will be an increasing market for designer embryos, likely a
significant one, despite inevitable controversy. This market will be fueled by
customers seeking a cheaper and more effective alternative to IVF and fed by
suppliers providing embryos created outside the human body. 356 Individual
suppliers will attempt to stand out in that market by implying, but not outright
promising, that resulting children will have, or not have, certain characteristics.
Recommendation – we cannot speak to the non-domestic markets as there is too
much uncertain or unknown in terms of policy or priority, but United States
embryo suppliers, supplying to American clients, should pay close attention to
what has happened and what that portends for the future. The technological
advances that may make market participation attractive will also present
353

It seems a safe assumption that this is one of the reasons so few states adopted UPA 2002 and none
without changes. See supra note 100. There was another uniform law proposed as well, see Uniform Status
of Children of Assisted Conception Act, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/fnact99/uscaca88.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2011). We find no
record of any state adopting this Act.
354

See Hugh McLachlan and J. Kim Swales, Commercial Surrogate Motherhood and the Alleged
Commodification of Children: A Defense of Legally Enforceable Contracts, available at
http://law.duke.edu/journals/lcp (last visited Jan. 3, 2010) (“In federations like the United States or the
European Union, the unevenness of legal restriction or regulation by individual states or countries
compounds the problem.”) But see Buzzanca v. Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr 2d. 280, 293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998)
(“…even though [that] might not be perfect on a case-by-case basis, [it] would bring some predictability to
those who seek to make use of artificial reproductive techniques.
355

In fact, that is precisely what attorney Noel Keane did. Frustrated that his home state of Michigan
treated compensation to surrogates as illegal, he sent couples to Kentucky where there was no such
restriction. See supra n. 147, at 98. Keane would become known as the “father of surrogate motherhood”.
Id.
356

It is unlikely that prospective parents will be able to find true embryo donors. At least one study
demonstrates that parents of preserved embryos cannot make a donation or “disposition decision”. See
Mundy, supra note 39, at 5. “The average embryo had been in storage for four years. Even after that much
time had elapsed, 72 % had not decided what to do, and a number echoed the words of one patient: ‘We
can’t talk about it.’” Id. at 5.
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increasing liability under causes of action for strict product liability and breach of
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose. While these are “unheard of” now,
they likely will become quite strident in the not too distant future.
4. Prediction – states will struggle with the legal status of embryos and this will
impact disposal of stored embryos and potential surrogate liability.

Recommendation – states not concluding that embryos have some “additional”
rights, or otherwise regulating surrogacy arrangements, should apply bailment
analysis as embryos are property. States statutorily defining embryos as “people”
must address disposal and surrogate liability under wrongful death causes of
action. States that have elevated embryo status, either at common law or by
statute, should follow a case-by-case analysis similar to Davis v. Davis, 357 with
the understanding that a) Davis was decided on different grounds; 358 b) at a point
in time before dramatic ART use growth commenced; 359 and c) these are
potentially highly volatile issues. 360 States that have fetal homicide statutes, or
otherwise at least tacitly treat embryos as more than property, should adopt caseby-case analysis as well.
5. Prediction – prospective parties will continue to develop and rely on surrogacy
contracts.
357
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358

Id. “Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreartion should prevail, assuming that the other party has
a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than the use of the [embryos] in question.”
359

So, potentially, there could be a lot of case-by-case analysis going forward. This may prove unwieldy to
courts seeking efficiency and clear precedent.
360

See supra note 213. On a related note, these are exactly the type of legal issues, ones with potentially
polarizing moral underpinnings, that could be potentially problematic for Judges, particularly elected
Judges engaging in case-by-case analysis, in light of recent events. See, e.g., Adam Cohen, Iowa Vote
Shows the Injustice of Electing Judges, available at
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,2030526,00.html (last visited Jan. 17, 2011). (All three
Iowa Supreme Court Justices failed to withstand retention vote after the Court unanimously upheld a pr-gay
marriage ruling in the prior term. It was the first time any Justice had been removed since 1962.) This type
of movement may just be getting started. See Removal of Iowa Judges May Inspire Similar Efforts,
available at http://thegazette.com/2010/11/05/removal-of-iowa-judges-may-inspire-similar-efforts/ (last
visited Jan. 17, 2011).
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Recommendation – would-be parties must be aware of the laws and public
policies of the jurisdictions that may interpret their agreements. 361 If not, they
may be unpleasantly surprised to learn that a) the contract is not enforceable; b)
the surrogate may have parental rights; c) the surrogate may have parental
responsibilities; and even d) parties may face criminal charges for pursuing
services abroad that are illegal domestically. 362 This multitude of uncertainties
epitomizes the plight of embryo donors and suppliers, surrogates and surrogate
providers, and prospective parents in the Cyberprocreation era. Ongoing
discussion and analysis is vital because, in terms of human reproduction, the
Internet generates more questions than answers.

361

See, e.g., P.G.M. v. J.M.A., 2007 Min. App. Unpub. LEXIS 1189. A New York male contracted with a
Minnesota female for surrogacy services. The couple executed a written gestational surrogacy agreement
“(GSA”) that specified the agreement was governed by Illinois law. The IVF and implantation procedures
took place at an Illinois clinic. The Minnesota court applied Illinois law. While this holding is straightforward, this case should not be read too broadly. The court reasoned that “Minnesota courts ‘ traditionally
enforce parties’ contractual law provisions.’” Id. at 7 of 12. However, the court also noted that “Minnesota
courts will not enforce an otherwise validly executed contract that contravenes public policy (citation
omitted). Contracts violate public policy when they injure some established societal interest (citation
omitted).” Id. at 9 of 12. The decision came down to the fact that there was no established public policy in
Minnesota prohibiting GSAs or the enforcement of GSAs. It can certainly be read to mean that the contract
would not have been enforced, despite the selection of Illinois law, if the result would have violated
Minnesota public policy. This is important to note as there are certainly states where a GSA would violate
such policy. Similar uncertainty may even exist within a state; Massachusetts’ courts have both upheld
choice of law provisions (see Hodas v. Morin, 814 N.E.2d 320 (Mass. 2004) and refused to uphold them
(see R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790 (Mass. 1998) in surrogacy agreements.
362

See Gilles Cuniberti, Flying to California to Bypass the French Ban on Surrogacy, available at
http://conflictoflaws.net/2007/flying-to-california-to-bypass-the-french-ban-on-surrogacy/ (last visited Jan.
17, 2011) (discussing a French couple who flew to California to use the services of an American
commercial surrogate as such services are illegal in France. They returned home, with twin girls, to find
multiple criminal charges for their actions. The counts were dismissed, but only on pleading technicalities,
and not for lack of merit.).

